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1 Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U .S. 816, 846 (1977) (Brennan, J.)(“[O]rdinarily procedural protection may be afforded to a liberty interest of one person without derogatingfrom the substantive liberty interest of another.  Here, [disputes over removal of children from fosterfamilies] such a tension is virtually unavoidable.”).
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December 3, 2003 To be published in THE VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW(December 2003)
THE TYRANNY OF TIME: VULNERABLE CHILDREN, “BAD” MOTHERS, AND STATUTORY DEADLINES IN PARENTAL TERMINATION PROCEEDINGSCatherine J. Rosss
In child welfare disputes, protections accorded to one party—parent, state, child orfoster parent—almost inevitably diminish the substantive interests of another.1  Once a childis placed in foster care, the inexorable progress of the case will presumably lead to only oneof two options: return to the family of origin or termination of parental rights followed bypermanent placement in another family.  Thus, from the time a child enters foster care the
2 Federal legislation requires that child welfare agencies engage in “concurrent planning” in which theydevelop plans for both the contingency that a child returns home after foster care and the contingency thatthe rights of the child’s biological parents will be terminated and the child will be free to enter a permanentplacement with another family. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, §101 (a), 111Stat. 2115 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1997)).
3 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 787(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 519 U.S. at 144 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[F]or many – if not most – parents,the termination of the right to raise their children would be an exaction more dearthan any other.”).  See alsoSantosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (Blackmun, J.) (“Few forms of state action are both so severe and so irreversible.”).
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potential exists for the interests of child and parent to diverge dramatically.  The conflictinginterests of child and parent are often transparent from the day the case file is opened.  Inother instances, however, where the state plans simultaneously for reunification ortermination of parental rights,2 the conflicting interests of child and parent are balancedagainst their potential mutual interests as the case progresses.  The conflicting interests and resulting tensions that can arise among parents, childrenand the state are particularly pronounced when the state seeks to terminate parental rights.These tensions have long been aggravated by the inability of the child welfare system to findthe proper balance between two competing imperatives.  The first requires the state toprotect children who are the victims of serious abuse or neglect and who, it is widelyunderstood, may suffer repeated trauma, and even death, if the state fails to interveneappropriately.  The second imperative is to minimize the psychological and social traumathat children often suffer when the state intervenes to remove them from the families thathave failed to meet their basic needs. No one disputes that the stakes in parental termination cases are high. Every currentmember of the Supreme Court agrees that “[f]ew consequences of judicial action are sograve as the severance of natural family ties.”3 Although the cases before the Court havefocused primarily on the legal significance and emotional devastation of termination for
4  See generally  JOSEPH GOLD ST EIN , ALBERT J. SOLN IT, SONJA GOLDSTEIN & THE LATE ANNA FREUD, INTHE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETR IMEN TAL ALTERNATIVE (1996) (applyingpsycholanalytic theory to the problem of state intervention in child placement and  emphasizing the child’spsychological need for continuity in a relationship with a primary caretaker);  JOHN BOWLBY,ATTACHMENT AND LOSS (1969) (examining the importance of a warm, intimate and  continuous relationshipwith a mother figure to a  child’s positive development.). 
5 Strengthening Abuse and Neglect Courts Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-314, 114 Stat. 1266, (2000) § 2 (2); See also Pub. L. 105-89 § 101 (a), 42 U.S.C.S. § 671 (a) (15) (A) (“[T]he child’s health and safety shall bethe paramount concern[]”). 
6 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified in scatteredsections of 42 U.S.C. (1998)).
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parents, separation from a parent is at least as grievous and traumatic for the childreninvolved.4  However, the interest that a child may have in preserving a relationship with aneglectful parent has received short shrift in the wake of recent federal reforms intended toensure permanent placements for all children within a short time after their entry into thefoster care system.Historically, when the state has chosen to respond to the plight of neglected children,it has done so paternalistically.  The traditional patriarchal ideal of family life did not accordchildren either autonomy or independent legal rights.  Modern rights theory, however, hasrecognized that minors may have legal claims independent of their parents that extendbeyond their need for nurturance as members of an intimate association of family members. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) states “explicitly for the first time inFederal law that a child’s health and safety must be the paramount consideration when anydecision is made regarding a child in the Nation’s child welfare system.”5  In doing so,ASFA places the potential conflicts of interest between children and their parents (in mostinstances their mothers) in stark relief.6 ASFA makes permanency “in a safe and stablehome, whether it be returning home, adoption, legal guardianship, or another permanent
7 Executive M emorandum on Adoption and Alternate Permanent Placement of Children in the Public ChildWelfare System, 32 W eekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2513 (Dec. 14, 1996). 
8 In using the term “abusive,” I refer to the abusers whose label raises no questions  - -  those who torture,drown, or fail even to note that a child has disappeared.
9 AM. BAR ASS’N PRES IDEN TIAL WORKING GROUP ON  THE UNMET LEGA L NEEDS O F CHILDREN AND THEIRFAMILIES, AMERICA’S CHILDREN AT RISK 50 (1993) (“Only about 10% of the cases in which states removechildren from their homes involve severe physical injury or severe sexual abuse.”).
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placement” the goal for all of the children who enter foster care.7  In keeping with itslaudatory goal of moving children quickly out of the child welfare system to some form ofstability, ASFA imposed an innovative federal time line, intended to insure that no childlingered in foster care for a period of years. By making the child’s safety and developmentthe priority, ASFA weighs the child’s security more heavily than the mother’s emotionalneeds and legal rights.   Looking at ASFA from the perspective of children’s rights, it is hardto see any drawbacks to ASFA’s categorical approach as applied to the bright line cases.Like ASFA, this paper is not concerned with the life circumstances that may have led the“abusive” mother to her predicament or her actions.8 This article is instead concerned withthose cases that lie outside bright-line labels and examines a paradox at the heart of recentefforts to improve the child welfare system: in their zeal to focus on the child in parentaltermination hearings, lawmakers imposed a categorical formula that unwittingly harms somechildren and mothers who are labeled “unfit” because of neglect. In the cases at the margins, those involving mothers who may or may not beneglectful, or who are victims in their own right, ASFA’s categorical treatment of mothersand children may not serve all children equally well.  Unfortunately, the marginal cases arenot rare.9  In this paper, I aim to highlight a dilemma central to the child welfare system: itmay not be possible to devise a legal principle that equitably addresses the interests of allneglected children and their mothers.  Attempts to impose such a categorical legal principle
5to neglect cases may result in less than optimal solutions for some individual children andmothers, and even instances of flagrant injustice to one or both.  On the other hand, it isincumbent upon the law, and on its theorists as well as its practitioners, to grapple with thehardest issues, such as how the passage of time affects the respective claims of a parent, achild and the state in the child welfare system.  Section I of this essay reviews the rights claims of parents generally, of mothersin particular, and of children.  Section II analyzes the key reform of ASFA, whichprovides that parental rights be terminated after a child has remained in foster care for 15out of the preceding 22 months. In doing so, I consider the conflicting interests andpostures of the child, the mother and the state, asking whether the passage of time aloneis ever sufficient justification for terminating parental rights in light of the protections thelaw affords parents.  Section III considers two categories of hard cases whichdemonstrate the vital liberty interests and practical needs of mothers and children: (1)cases involving substance abusing mothers and (2) cases involving battered motherswhose children were removed despite the mother’s success in protecting the child fromobserving or experiencing violence.  Both of these categories illustrate that, in someinstances, children’s interests might be better served by flexibility where the child assertsa claim to a continued relationship with a biological parent. 
10 According to the 2000 census, of the 37 million families with children in the United States, roughly tenmillion families are headed by a single mother, and two million families by a single father. Jason Fields &Lynne M. Casper,  America’s Families and Living Arrangements,  CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, June2001, at 6-7   (U.S. Census Bureau 2001). Five percent of all children live with a single father without theirmother or another female partner being present.  Id. at 7. See also  Jason Fields, Living Arrangements ofChildren,  CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, April 2001, at 5-6 (U.S. Census Bureau 2001)(comparing 1996U.S. Census statistics concerning numbers of children residing with unmarried mothers and  fathers). Mostof the remainder live with a married or unmarried couple, which includes one of their parents. Fields &Casper, supra , at 13.  Another 1.3 million children live with a grandparent, without either parent. Fields,supra , at 12. Although the census data are not specific, experience indicates that children living with theirgrandparents are likely to be living with a grandmother.
As Annette Appell has pointed out, “the constitutional definition of parent differentiates between women asmothers and men as fathers. . . .   Parenthood to date requires a biological connection between the motherand child; a nurturing connection between the prospective other parent and the mother; or a nurturing andgenetic connection to the child” for those who claim fatherhood.  Annette Ruth Appell,  Virtual Mothersand the Meaning of Parenthood,  34 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 683, 694 (2001).
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I.  Rights Perspectives: Parents, Women and ChildrenThe vast majority of children live with their mothers, whether in single parenthouseholds, with their father as well as their mother, or with their mother and her significantother 10  This necessarily means that where abuse or neglect takes place, a mother’s role islikely to be at issue, either as a perpetrator, for placing the child in harm’s way, or for failureto protect the child from another adult.  Indeed, when we talk about child abuse and neglectwe are almost always talking, at some level, about mothers and their children, even if themother’s partner is the abuser. This section first considers the constitutional rights accorded to parents, regardless ofsex, and the ways in which those rights diminish the independent claims of children.  It thenconsiders the role of feminist theory in discussions of the rights of mothers and children inthe context of child abuse and neglect.  Finally, it offers a way of thinking about children’slegal claims within the child welfare system separate from those of their parents, withparticular emphasis on the legal regime created by ASFA.
11  I have argued elsewhere that minors should and do have legal rights independent of their parents.Catherine J . Ross,  An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive Information,  2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223(1999) [hereinafter An Emerging Right]; Catherine J . Ross,  From Vulnerability to Voice: AppointingCounsel for Children in Civil Litigation,  64  FO R DH A M  L. REV. 1571 (1996) [hereinafter Vulnerability toVoice].   
12  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000);  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923);  Pierce v. Society ofSisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);  M.L.B. v. S. L. J. , 519 U.S. 102, 119 (1996) (the Lassiter and Santoskycourts were “unanimously of the view that ‘the interest of parents in their relationship with their children issufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty interests protected by the FourteenthAmendment.’,” quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455  U.S. 745, 774 (1982) (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting)). SeeDavid D. Meyer,  Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1125(2001); David D. Meyer,  The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53  VAND. L. REV. 527 (2000).
13  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
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A.  Parental Liberty Interests and Due Process RightsEven in the context of the modern child welfare system, the constitutional rights ofparents frequently subsume the legal rights of their children.11  The Supreme Court hasfound a substantive liberty interest in parenting,12 which “does not evaporate simply because[the parents] have not been model parents or have lost temporarily the custody of their childto the State.  Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest inpreventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”13  The resulting legalpresumption that parents speak for their children does not fully evaporate once the childrencome to attention of a child welfare agency, or even once a child enters foster care.  Underthis legal regime, as opposed to a therapeutic one, information must be considered in acertain order.  Before a court can assume that the child or someone else claiming to speakfor the child (such as the state or an appointed guardian ad litem) is in a better position thanthe parent to present the child’s best interests to the court, the court must determine that theparent has behaved in a way that justifies stripping the parent of her presumed identity ofinterests with her child.  Only after such a finding may a court determine that the parent nolonger speaks for this particular child.  Consequently, any legislative initiative designed to
14 In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ill. 2001).
15  See Catherine J . Ross,  Anything Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children fromControversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 463-67 [hereinafter Anything Goes] (discussing the lack ofjudicial scrutiny accorded to the state’s claims of a compelling interest in protecting children in the contextof regulations on controversial speech).
16 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
17 Id. at 657.
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elevate the child’s developmental needs over the rights of his or her parents may conflictwith generally applicable constitutional principles protecting the family unit as a whole.  It iscritical, therefore, to understand the scope and strength of the parent’s rights before seekingto explicate the balance of interests between children and their parents in the context of thechild welfare system.The substantive due process jurisprudence that governs claims involving a parent’sliberty interest in his or her child requires a court to engage in strict scrutiny of governmentintervention.  In short, any infringement on the parent’s rights must be narrowly tailored toserve a compelling state interest.14  But while the government’s compelling interest insafeguarding children is rarely questioned, the means the government uses to achieve itsgoals are frequently the subject of litigation.15 The liberty interest of parents in their children also mandates procedural protectionsbefore a parent’s rights may be terminated.  In the 1972 case of Stanley v. Illinois theSupreme Court held that a state may not deprive a parent of his or her parental rights withoutan individualized determination of the parent’s fitness.16  Speed and efficiency, the Courtdeclared, may not be allowed to run “roughshod over the important interests of both parentand child.”17  In subsequent cases the Supreme Court examined three procedural issues that
18 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (While Justice Powell took no part in theconsideration or voting in Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), he voted with the five person majority in Lassiter).
19 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27-28, 31-32 (applying formula set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335(1976)). 
20 Lassiter , 452 U.S. at 33-34. At the time Lassiter was decided, the Court noted that thirty-three states andthe District of Columbia provided appointed counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings, andthat nothing suggested that such statutes were other than “enlightened and wise.” Id at 34. Since Lassiterwas decided, the wave of opinion in the states has become even more pronounced. See Brown v. Divisionof Family Services, 803 A.2d 948, 952-53 (Del. 2002) (since Lassiter was decided, “there have beensubstantial dynamic statutory and procedural developments”  regarding the right to counsel in terminationof parental rights proceedings). In 2002, the Supreme Court of Delaware noted that Delaware was one ofonly five states that have not “established a r ight for indigent parents to  be represented by counsel at Stateexpense in dependency and neglect proceedings….  [either by statute] or as a matter of state constitutionallaw.”Brown, 803 A.2d  at 955. Nonetheless, like most other states, Delaware “routinely appoints” counsel toindigent parents who request it.  Id. at 957-58 (holding that Delaware must provide timely notice  to parentsthat they may have a right to representation at the state’s expense in termination proceedings and expresslyreserving the question of whether indigent parents are entitled to state-appointed counsel at all stages ofdependency and neglect proceedings).  
21 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 747, 756 (1982).
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arise in termination cases: the right to appointed counsel, the standard of proof, and the rightto an appeal.  In its 1981 opinion in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Court heldthat due process does not require appointment of counsel for parents in all terminationproceedings.18  The Lassiter opinion makes clear, however, that an appellate court mayreverse a trial court’s decision not to appoint counsel if the decision violates fundamentalfairness under the facts of the case.19  In addition, although the Court found thatappointing counsel is not constitutionally required in all termination cases, the majoritynoted that a “wise public policy” would require appointing counsel for parents whocannot afford attorneys at all stages of dependency proceedings.20 The Supreme Court has ruminated on the high personal stakes that make terminationof parental rights something more than an “ordinary civil action” resulting in “‘mere loss ofmoney.’”21  In Santosky v. Kramer, decided the year following Lassiter, the Supreme Court
22 Id. at 747-48.
23 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996) (holding the state may not block an appeal by an indigentparent who cannot afford to purchase a copy of the trial transcript).
24 Id. at 124.
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held that in light of the stakes in termination proceedings, due process requires that the statesupport its allegations by an elevated evidentiary standard  -- “at least clear and convincingevidence” -- before it may “sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in theirnatural child.”22 Most recently, in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., the Supreme Court held that the due process andequal protection clauses mandate that a state may not deny appellate review to a personwhose parental rights have been terminated.  The Court held that states must provide everyparent with access to the appellate courts following termination of parental rights regardlessof the parent’s ability to pay the requisite costs.23  In the context of a contested step-parentadoption, the M.L.B. majority again focused on the substantial and irreparable injury toparents who lose all rights to their children, as well as the potential for judicial error, inholding that “decrees forever terminating parental rights” fall into “the category of cases inwhich the State may not ‘bolt the door to equal justice.’”24 The Court, however, did notbalance the child’s potential interests against the parent’s rights, and did not have before itthe argument that delay—whether caused by the appellate process or by othercontingencies— unjustly prolongs the child’s uncertainty about her fate.The cases from Lassiter through M.L.B. establish the parameters of the rights andpresumptions that parents bring to termination proceedings.  These constitutional protectionsfor parents are critical, especially since the fact-finding stage of a termination proceeding
25 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 . 
26 Id.
27See Id. at 760 & n.10.
28 Id. ; See Ross, Vulnerability to Voice, supra  note 11, at 1579-86.
29 Santosky 455 U.S. at 751, 760-61 nn.10-11.
30 Id. at 760.
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“pits the state directly against the parents.”25  At this stage, the trial court’s task is limited todetermining whether “the natural parents are at fault.”26  This finding of “fault” isunderstood to be a prerequisite for the conclusion that these particular “parents are unfit toraise their own children.”27  Because it is assumed that children are generally best served byremaining with their parents, and a finding of fault could lead to their permanent removalfrom their parents’ care, courts presume that the interests of children converge with theinterests of parents at legal proceedings.   This presumption remains, even where the factsappear to clearly rebut it.28 In Santosky, for example, the parents’ interests were viewed asconverging with their children’s despite the fact that one boy, who had been removed fromhis parents when he was only three days old, was seven when the case was argued and hadnever lived with his parents.29  Yet even on those facts, the Court preserved the legal fictionthat parents and child speak with one voice, insisting “until the State proves parentalunfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous terminationof their natural relationship;” only after the State proves parental unfitness, are the interestsof parent and child deemed to “diverge.”30
31 Id.  at 760 n.10.
32 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U .S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. &Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)).
33 Smith , 431 U.S. at 826-28.
34 The bundle of sticks analogy clarifies the notion that the rights associated with ownership of property canbe “unbundled or disaggregated.”  If the property is a bundle of sticks, the owner may give away one ormore sticks while retaining the balance of the bundle.  The sticks may represent temporary interests such asa particular usage or a term of years.  As Joseph Singer explains it, “A particular piece of property mayhave multiple owners of different sticks in the bundle of rights that comprises full ownership.  When we areasked to determine who owns a particular stick in the bundle, it may not help us to know who the “owner”of the land is because ownership of various sticks in the bundle may be spread among several people.”Joseph W illiam Singer, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 2-3 (2001).  
35Id. at 828 & n.20.
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The Supreme Court has expressed doubts about whether “the State constitutionallycould terminate a parent’s rights without showing parental unfitness,” although it has neverdirectly confronted the question.31  In obiter dicta, the Court opined that [w]e have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended '[if] aState were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over theobjections of the parents and their children, without some showing ofunfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in thechildren’s best interest.’32Notwithstanding the due process protections accorded the liberty interest ofbiological parents in their children, once a child enters foster care, the parental rights andresponsibilities for that child are apportioned among biological parent, foster parent and thestate.33  The manner of this division resembles nothing so much as the proverbial bundle ofsticks well known in introductory law school property classes, reminding us of the longcommon law history of treating children as property.34 No matter how long the child remainsin foster care, he or she continues to “belong” to the natural parent in some respects.35  Thatnatural parent – although stripped of custody and day-to-day decision making once a childenters foster care retains the sole ability to make decisions regarding surgery and the right to
36Id. at 828 n.20. For example, a Michigan court recently refused to authorize surgery to implantcontroversial hearing aids in two deaf boys in foster care over the objection of their mother, who the courtheld re tained authority over elective surgery unless and until she loses custody permanently. Jon Hall, Mich. Judge Rules Deaf Boys Needn’t Undergo Surgery, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 5, 2002, at A-3.
37 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745.
38  Id. at 759.
39 See Id. at 760
40 See Richard J. Gelles & Ira Schwartz ,  Children and the Child Welfare System, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 95,96 (1999) (arguing that child welfare decision making is almost always “tilted in favor of the parents’ rightsat the expense of a child’s protection”); See also  ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSEAND NEGLECT, FOSTER CARE DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 113 (1999) (constitutional law“gives adults fundamental rights to parent their children, while giving children no rights to be parented in anurturing way.”).
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marry or enlist in the armed forces as a minor, among other decisions, and is presumed torepresent the child’s legal interests, retaining what amounts to a future interest in the child.36  
The Supreme Court made it clear in Santosky that there is no room at the fact-findingstage of a termination proceeding to weigh either the child’s independent interest or thechild’s relationship with a foster family against the rights of the natural parents in the carecustody and nurture of their child.37  The focus during fact-finding at a terminationproceeding is “emphatically” not on the child, or the other opportunities open to the child,but only on whether “the natural parents are at fault” as the state alleges.38  There is no roomfor the child’s perspective— even when there is lack of attachment to the natural parents orpositive attachment to current caregivers such as foster parents—until the court turns todisposition.39  Nor can the court consider the child’s need for protection and safety outsidethe context of parental fault.40Similarly, lower courts have expressly held that while the best interests of the childshould be paramount in all proceedings to terminate parental rights, “a court may not base
41 In re Welfare of M.H., 595 N.W.2d 223, 228 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing In re Welfare of J.K., 374N.W .2d 463, 466 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)) (emphasis added). See also  David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solvingthe Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 785-86 (1999) [hereinafterFamily Ties].
42 M.H., 595 N.W.2d at 226.
43 S.L. v. C.A., 995 P.2d 17, 29-30 (U tah Ct. App. 1999) (Wilkins, J., concurring).  See also  Minn. Stat. §260C.301 subd. 7 (Supp. 1999) (stating that best interests are considered after the court finds that at leastone of the statutory criteria for terminating parental rights has been established).  
44 In limited instances in some states, however, a court may use the best interests inquiry to  determine that asound reason exists not to terminate parental rights, even though the court has already determined that thestatutory grounds for termination have been satisfied . See E.g ., State v. Timperly, 750 P. 2d 1234, 1238(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (opining that the  best interests of the child remains a principal consideration intermination proceedings, and in this instance  supports termination). See Martin Guggenheim,  The Effects ofRecent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care—An EmpiricalAnalysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 136 (1995) (urging judges to “inquire into the child’s bestinterests and not presume, merely because statutory grounds exist to terminate parental rights, the child’sbest interests are served by doing so” particularly where no viable permanent placement is likely).
14
termination of parental rights solely on the best interests of a child.”41  In order to terminateparental rights, a court must first find that at least one statutory ground for terminationexists.42  Consistent with the discussion in Santosky, state laws governing terminationprovide for a bifurcated analysis. First, the court must ask whether sufficient statutorygrounds have been shown for terminating the parent’s rights (with due consideration to theparent’s constitutional rights).  Only then may the court reach the second question: whethertermination of parental rights in fact serves the child’s best interest.43  If the statutorygrounds for termination have been well framed and the evidence that those grounds havebeen met is clear and convincing, the child’s best interests will normally be served bytermination, particularly if the state has already identified a permanent or adoptive home forthe child.44  
45 MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGA L THEORY, 78 (2d ed. 2003).  See alsoKATHARINE T. BARTLETT AND ANGELA P. HAR RIS, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMM ENTARY1007-9 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing the meanings of the term “essentialism”). 
46 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXU AL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETHCENTURY TRAGEDIES 38, 51 (1995).
47 See generally JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TODO ABOUT IT (2000); Jane C . Murphy,  Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare“Reform,” Family, and Criminal Law, 83 COR NE LL L. REV. 688 (1998); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXU AL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); CarolSanger,  Separating from Children, 96 COLUMBIA L. REV. 375 (1996). 
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B.  Women’s Rights and Feminist TheoryWhen the abusive or neglectful parent who asserts a liberty interest and theconcomitant procedural protections is a mother, an additional array of troubling culturaland theoretical issues emerges.  These include the very definitions of “woman,”“mother,” and themes of essentialism and anti-essentialism.  Essentialism and anti-essentialism refer to the notion that all women share, or do not share, a commonexperience, and are, or are not, characterized by common attributes.45  Of course, theterms “woman,” and “mother” are loaded with normative assumptions.  To be a womanis to be a current, past, or future mother, regardless of individual choice and reality.46  Tobe a mother is normatively to be a “good” mother, so that the adjective need not even bestated.  A “mother” by default is the normative mother, a socially constructed image thatencapsulates many presumptions—especially those of a woman who is middle-class,married, and a caretaker.  In this view, only the unusual, deviant mother requires aprefatory adjective: “single,” “working,” “welfare,” or “bad.”  In reality, as somefeminist scholars have pointed out, an infinite variety of women and mothers exist.47Proceedings to terminate parental rights offer an enormous variety of portraits of
48 Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn,  Child Abuse: A  Problem for Feminist Theory , 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 75,76 (1993).
49 Id. at 78, 79, 109.
50 Mary E. B ecker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support Systems, CustodyOutcomes, and Liability for Acts of Others,  2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROU ND TAB LE 13, 13 (1995). See also  BarbaraBennett W oodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (1999)(discussing the emerging dialogue about child abuse between “feminists and child advocates”).
51 Becker, supra  note 48, at 14.
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mothers. Women who have abused, neglected, or failed to protect the children may besingle, married, cohabiting or divorced.  Despite the ease with which we can locate these mothers in the real world,feminist theory has “largely ignored ‘bad mothers’ and their implications for childabuse.”48 This silence may reflect a defensive mechanism exercised by feminists in legalpractice either because they are reluctant to believe that their clients had “beaten, struck,or kicked their children,” or because those realities are so difficult to “understand orinterpret.” Feminist scholars in turn skirted the issue because the facts did not mesh withan early feminist meta-narrative of women as victims.49 Recently, however, feministscholars have also recognized that “women are not only victims … they are often guiltythemselves as agents who abuse children or fail to protect them.”50  The admission that women may abuse power and fail to protect their childrenimplicates two distinguishable categories of offense.51  In the first, the woman herself isthe agent of aggressive or passive acts that harm her children.  In the second, thewoman’s liability stems from her failure to protect her children from abuse or neglect atthe hands of third party.  In this second category, feminist theory suggests the importanceof clearly distinguishing the acts and omissions attributable to the mother from those ofthe primary source of the harm (commonly the child’s father or the mother’s male
52 See Michelle J . Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences: A NewLaw on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 1465, 1477-85 (discussing evolution of the maritalrape exemption); and.Reva Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105YALE L. J. 2117 (1996) (addressing the immunity from suit of husbands who beat their wives). 
53 See generally Martha M inow, Words and the Door to the Land  of Change: Law, Language, and FamilyViolence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1682-83 (1990); Ashe & Cahn, supra note 46, at 109; Nicholson v.Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 163-64 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
54 See Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemma of Criminalization, 49 DEPAULL. REV. 817, 822-826 (2000) (discussing the delicate balance in the criminal and civil legal systems of howto protect both women and children without subordinating either group to the other).
55 See Sarah H. Ramsey, Children in Poverty: Reconciling Children’s Interests with Child ProtectiveServices and Welfare Policies: A Response to  Ward Doran and Dorothy Roterts , 61 MD. L. REV. 437, 441-42 (2003)(discussing reports of abuse and neglect from caseworkers in the Temporary Assistance to NeedyFamilies Program (“TANF”) based on extreme poverty and homelessness); Leroy H. Pelton, Commentary,Future Child .  Spring 1998 at 126-29 (criticizing the negative stereotypes of impoverished parents in a
17
companion).  Just as feminist scholars have highlighted the injustices wrought by thetraditional legal presumption that a man and his wife were a single legal unit for purposesof spousal violence,52 so too must contemporary courts learn to distinguish when motherscan and cannot be held accountable for the actions of the men in their lives.  Women whoknow that a particular person threatens their child’s safety and nevertheless fail to protectthe child from predictable or on-going harm, however, transform themselves into agentsof abuse. For example, the mother who refuses to leave a man who she learns is sexuallyabusing her daughter is not a safe custodian for that child. Analysis of the context in which events occur and individuals make decisions, amajor contribution of feminist theory to the understanding of family violence, has nowentered enlightened mainstream discussion,53 but is frequently overlooked in childwelfare decision-making. In context, victimization and social structures contribute to thedetermination of which women regain their children from the child welfare system andwhich women lose them forever.54 Extreme poverty in the face of a lack of services,single parenthood and race all contribute to both initial intervention and ultimate removalof children.55
public child welfare system which is “a coercive apparatus wrapped in a helping orientation.”) and sourcescited in footnote 61 infra.
56 Presuming for purposes of this discussion that standards of proof are met and adequate proceduralprotections have been provided, I will assume that the mother who allegedly drowned, knifed or scalded herchild intentionally actually did so. The theoretical problems raised by such cases are distinguishable fromthose raised by the neglect cases. Moreover, the issues of physical safety and the child’s ability to trust hisor her caretaker are starkly framed  in such abuse cases.  G OLDSTEIN ET AL., supra  note 4 ; RICHARD J.GELLES, THE BOO K OF DAV ID: HO W  PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COST CHILDREN’S LIVES (1996). 57 42 U.S.C.A. § 671 (a) (15) (D) (i) (West 2003) (stating that aggravated circumstances, which shall bedefined by state law, include but are not limited to “abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexualabuse”).
58 See Cynthia R. Mabry, Second Chances: Insuring that Poor Families Remain Intact by MinimizingSocioeconom ic Ramifications o f Poverty, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 607, 612-14, 616-24 (2000). See generallySymposium, The Rights of Parents With Children in Foster Care: Removals from Economic Hardship andthe Predictive Power of Race,  6 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 115 (2003) (experts discussing removals of childrenfrom poor parents of color because of child neglect arising from poverty).
59 See Mabry, supra  note 58 at 610-11 (2000).
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It is not my purpose here to contribute to the theoretical debate over the parametersof what defines a “bad mother.” Instead, I distinguish between two groups of “bad” mothers. The first group, which does not concern me here,56 consists of the small minority of motherswho kill or physically assault their children or engage in other acts which the law labels“aggravated circumstances,” eliminating the need for efforts to reunite the survivingmembers of the family under the express provisions of ASFA.57  Although the mothers whoengage in such aggravated behavior can be viewed as bad, indifferent, victims, or all three,depending on the worldview of the observer, from the perspective of the child, ASFAcorrectly puts the child’s need for safety and stability ahead of the mother’s needs and rights.The second group of mothers, the group upon which I focus my discussion, consistsof women whose children dominate the foster care population. These mothers are labeled“neglectful” for any number of reasons, including substance abuse, poverty, homelessness,and so forth.58  In some instances, neglect that poses a serious physical and/or psychologicalthreat to the child cannot easily be addressed through services.59  In other cases, if services
60 Id. at 626-49 (surveying programs and services that help  parents either retain or regain custody of theirchildren).
61  See generally  DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR O F CHILD WELFARE (2002)(discussing the influence of race permeating America’s child welfare system); Tonya L. Brito, TheWelfarization of Family Law, 48 U .KAN. L. REV. 229 (2000) (evaluating the intersection and overlap offamily law and welfare law); Catherine J. Ross and Naomi R. Cahn, Subsidy for Caretaking in  Families:Lessons from Foster Care, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 55, 70 (2000) (investigating thesocioeconomic assumptions underlying the federalization of foster care). See also  Leroy H. Pelton, ChildAbuse and Neglect: The Myth of Classlessness, 48(4) AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 608 (1978) (arguing that arelationship exists between poverty, child  abuse and neglect that should not be ignored); ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTIONALTERNATIVE (1999) (admitting that race and class discrimination does influence state intervention in thefamily and that coercive intervention disparately impacts poor and minority race parents).
62  Ramsey, supra  note 55, at 445;   and Diane J. English, The Extent and Consequences of ChildMaltreatment, Future  Child., Spring 1998, at 49-51 (victims of neglect are the lowest child welfare agencypriority and “receive few services”).
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were available and provided in timely fashion, neither the initial removal of the child fromthe home nor the eventual termination of parental rights would likely prove necessary.60 The label of neglectful parent is skewed by class, race, culture and ethnicity from thepoint of reporting and investigation through removal and termination.61  To the extent thatchild welfare agencies or courts view some mothers as “bad” or neglectful based on nothingmore than cultural difference or poverty, such failure to conform to an idealized notion offamily life does not constitute a legitimate basis for removing a child. One commentator,discussing persistent complaints about the lack of funding for preventive services, concluded“[a]lthough in theory children are not removed from their parents because of poverty … thisdistinction cannot be maintained.”62  For example, Adriana Recodo, “the victim of anabusive domestic relationship . . . had no income, no place to live and no transportation.  When she sought help from a social worker, she received a referral to a psychologist and herson entered foster care.  Recodo was studying for her G.E.D., and seeking employment.  Shecould not find stable housing, but the state did not provide her with housing assistance.  Herparental rights were terminated due to “chronic instability” in her employment and
63  Recodo v. State, 930 P.2d 1128, 1133 (Nev. 1997).
64 Id.
65  Id., at 1136 (Springer, J., dissenting).
66 Martha Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 15 (1999) [hereinafter Fineman, Foundational Myths]; MarthaFineman, The Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of Subsidy, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 89, 90-91(1998) [hereinafter Fineman, Inevitability].
67 See Fineman, Foundational Myths, supra note 66, at 19-20; Fineman, Inevitability, supra  note 59, at 90-91.
68 See Ross & Cahn, supra note 61, at 57-58.
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housing.63  The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the termination,64 but a pointed dissentput Recodo’s case in the context of other termination cases that had reached the state’shighest court, concluding that “the State’s modus operandi appears to be to go into thehomes of handicapped, powerless and usually very poor parents, remove their children …and put the children into the home of substitute parents who are more affluent than thenatural parents and more pleasing to social service agents than the natural parents.”65Yet the relationship between poverty and entrance into foster care should not besurprising. It is inseparable from our society’s public expectations and legal normsconcerning the privatization of caretaking.66  The denial of collective responsibility forcaretaking in favor of norms that emphasize autonomy and self-reliance, as Martha Finemanhas argued, deprives caretakers of the social, financial and government support that many ofthem desperately need.67  The institution of foster care itself may be understood as asubstitution of one private caretaking unit for another, albeit with a small governmentsubsidy (and the oversight that accompanies subsidy in our system).68 The children ofneglectful parents would benefit most from a more sensitive filtering system, in which
69 See generally, Goldstein et al., supra  note 4 (arguing for minimum state intervention into families and useof the “least detrimental alternative” which may include maintenance of the status quo or providingsupportive assistance).
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neglect that does not result in serious harm or danger would trigger benefits in the form ofservices, rather than potentially unwarranted removal.69 It is likely that a regime in which the child’s rights were given weight would result infewer instances of children being removed from borderline domestic situations.  In anattempt to articulate current attitudes towards children’s rights, the following sectionexamines the child’s independent interests within the child welfare system.
70 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1809-11 (1993); Appell, supra note 10, at 701-703.
71 In other contexts, I have argued that children should have the right to counsel in civil litigation wheretheir parents do not adequately speak for them, and should have the right to access information essential totheir exercise of constitutional rights from public sources even over their parents’ objections.  See Ross, AnEmerging Right, supra note 11, at 225-26. See Ross, Vulnerability to Voice, supra note 11, at 1572-74. Onthe other hand, I have argued that parents have the right to monitor their children’s access to controversialmaterial, and that children need their parents’ advice in the context of the juvenile justice system. See Ross,Anything Goes, supra  note 15, at 476-87. See Catherine J . Ross, Implementing Constitutional Rights forJuveniles: The Parent-Child Privilege in Context, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 85, 107-114  (2003).
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C.  Children’s RightsYoung children are not autonomous persons.  The law recognizes that children needadults to nurture and supervise them.70  The parental rights doctrine is premised in part onthis notion, and the child welfare system is in turn based upon the view that if the biologicalparents prove unfit for the job of raising their children, the state has a compelling interest inreplacing the failed parent with one who is up to the challenge.  The state’s interest in thehealthy development of its youngest citizens is deemed to allow the state to substitute itselfand its representatives to be spokespersons for the children in lieu of unfit biological parents.Just as feminists have argued that the woman and man in a marital unit should not becollapsed into one legal and cultural identity, so too children’s rights advocates emphasizethe importance of being able to distinguish when a child’s interests converge with that of theparent, and when it is imperative to recognize that the needs or interests of parent and childsubstantially diverge.71  In the context of the child welfare system, it may be inappropriate toassume that the child’s needs are fully represented by the parent’s legal claims.  At the sametime, it oversimplifies matters to presume that the interests of a child in foster care areirretrievably at odds with those of her parents.  Instead, to do justice to the potentiallycompeting claims of mothers and children in the child welfare system, we need to struggle tofind a way to hear the voice of the individual child.72  While the voices of children of various
72 See generally , Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the Rights ofChildren, 68 TE M P. L. REV. 1585 (1995) (arguing that children should not be excluded from the rhetoric ofrights and that children should be empowered to voice their preferences about custody in divorce cases).
73 Ross, An Emerging Right, supra  note 11, at 242-50. 
74  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745.
75 See M eyer, Fam ily Ties, supra  note 41, at 778-92 (surveying cases).
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ages may be treated differently because the balance of dependency and autonomy shiftsduring the process of maturation,73 even very young children may have ways ofcommunicating about their needs.  However, once the law has assigned the designation of “parent” to a particular adult,parental rights doctrine as interpreted by Santosky dictates that the child has no voiceseparate from the parent in court until grounds for termination are established.74 Because ofthe importance of parental rights doctrine, courts will not normally substitute the child’s bestinterest for an analysis of parental fault. Courts frequently decline weigh the uniquecircumstances of a child’s life, even where they suggest that the child’s emotional well-being would be served by taking into consideration factors other than parental fault, such asthe child’s attachment to caretakers.75This was the issue in the case of “Baby Jessica” DeBoer, who was wrongfullyadopted at the age of 17 days, even though her father’s rights had not been terminated.  Shewas two years old and had known no parents other than her adoptive mother and fatherwhen Justice Stevens refused to stay the lower court’s order returning her to her naturalparents.  Justice Stevens explained that no law “authorizes unrelated persons to retaincustody of a child whose natural parents have not been found to be unfit, simply because
76 DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1993)(Stevens, Circuit Justice) (denying application for a stayby Jessica’s adoptive parents). 
77 In re Petition of Doe, 638 N .E.2d 181, 183 (Ill. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
78 For a discussion of Richard’s perspective based on his 3-year relationship with his adoptive parents seeGoldstein et al., supra  note 4 at 51-61.
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they may be better able to provide for her.”76  In the similar and equally controversial case of“Baby Richard,” the father only discovered that Richard was alive 57 days after the birth,well after Richard had been adopted.  Ruling that the father's rights had been terminatedimproperly, the Illinois Supreme Court held that courts may not consider the best interests ofthe child before determining, as a threshold matter, that parental rights should be terminated. If they could, the court opined, “few parents would be secure in the custody of their ownchildren.”77  The corollary of this principle is that every child should be secure in herparents’ custody.  Thus the issue in both cases, decided in the context of private adoptionrather than of the child welfare system, was a profound disagreement between advocates forthe children and the birth fathers78 over whether to define “parents” based on biology or onthe child’s emotional experience.
79 H.R. REP. NO. 105-77, at 8 (1997), reprin ted in  1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2740;LaShawn v. Dixon, 762F. Supp. 959, 960  (D.D.C. 1991).
80 Donald D uquette & M ark Hardin, Guidelines for Public Policy and State Legislation GoverningPermanence for Children, I-7 (Dep’t of Health & Human Services June, 1999).
81 Robert M . Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and  Failure of the Adoption and SafeFamilies Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 649 (1999).
82 Id. at 647.
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D.  The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997The pendulum of child welfare reform has repeatedly swung between efforts topreserve troubled families at virtually all costs and a passion to rescue every child in need. At the height of a prevailing but oversimplified interpretation of family preservation in themid-1990’s, about half–a-million children were in foster care because they had been“rescued” and were waiting for their parents to be rehabilitated so that they could returnhome.  In many of these situations, the facts made clear that they were unlikely ever to rejointheir parents. Although foster care was designed as a temporary expedient and wasadministered as if it were in fact temporary, increasing numbers of children were spendingthree years or more in foster care, many of them in a series of homes.  This phenomenonbecame known as “foster care drift.”79  About one-third of the children in foster care wouldnever return home.80 Instead, many of these children grew up in a series of foster homes andinstitutions, languishing for years in a child welfare system that moved at a “glacial pace.”81 At the same time, publicity focused awareness on several egregious cases of children whohad been returned to their families, only to die at the hands of a parent.82Eventually, the increasingly widespread perception that the foster care system wasout of control and hurting children led to a congressional search for uniform solutions based
83 For ASFA’s legislative history and the core provisions that history produced,see Rachel Venier, ParentalRights and the Best Interests of the Child: Implications of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 onDomestic Violence Victims’ Rights, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 517, 523-29 (2000); Stephanie JillGendell, In Search of Permanency: A Reflection on the First 3 Years of the Adoption and Safe Families ActImplementation, 39(1) FAM. CT. REV. 25, 27-29 (2001); Gordon, supra  note 70, at 646-56; Libby S. Adler,The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38HARV. J. ON LEG IS. 1, 3-10 (2001).
84 Gendell, supra  note 83, at 25 (quoting 143 CONG. REC. H2017 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997)).
85 Robert Gordon credits these influential thinkers with influencing the legislation.  Gordon, supra note 73at 652-656. The ideas of Goldstein and his co-authors also influenced the 1980 Adoption Assistance andChild Welfare Act. Guggenheim, supra note 42, at 124 (stating that Goldstein and his fellow authorsemphasized that the state should avoid “disruption of the parent-child relationship lest the child sufferemotional damage,” but did not distinguish between biological and non-biological relationships thatincluded relationships with foster parents).
86 Goldstein et al., supra  note 4 at 19, 41, 89-92.
87 Duquette & Hardin, supra note 80, at I-7. Indeed, this perspective ensures that the goals of ASFA, thechild’s health and safety, remain paramount. See Gordon, supra note 81, at 637 n.6.The federal government’s recent guidelines for implementing ASFA were developed “by a cross-disciplinary group of experts in child welfare” and “reflect their best thinking about child welfare policyframeworks and what ought to be.” Duquette & Harding, supra note 80, at i (quoting Carol Williams,Associate Commissioner, Dep’t Health & Human Services). I had the privilege of chairing the sub-groupthat developed standards for legal representation. The guidelines recommend that parents receive“competent legal representation” “at all court hearings, including at the preliminary protective proceeding.”
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on the child’s need for safety, nurturance and permanency.83  ASFA, enacted withoverwhelming bipartisan support, proclaimed “two basic goals: [p]reventing children frombeing returned to unsafe homes, and finding safe and loving and permanent homes forchildren who cannot be reunited with their families.”84  Like other child welfare reform efforts since the 1970’s, ASFA drew heavily on thechild development principles set forth in the influential work of Joseph Goldstein, AlbertSolnit, and Anna Freud.85  These principles include consideration of (1) the child’s need forparental continuity—an adult who serves as the child’s “psychological parent,” (2) theimportance of instilling in the child the feeling of being safe, protected and loved, and (3) thechild’s compressed sense of time and the concomitant urgency of resolution.86 Above all, theleading interpreters of ASFA called on those charged with applying the law to look at thefoster care system “through the eyes of the child.”87
Id. at VII-5.  See also  Brown v. Division of Family Services, 803 A.2d  948, 954 (Del. 2002) (discussingthese guidelines).
88 Statements on the floor of Congress highlighted the potential conflicts between the rights and needs ofchildren and parents. See Gordon, supra note 81, at 637 n. 6.  
89 Senator DeW ine said “[W]e have to start worrying more about the children’s rights and less about therights of the natural parents,” while Representative Hoyer in the House said “our child welfare system toooften protects parents’ rights rather than children’s rights.”  Gordon, supra note 81, at 637 n. 6 (quoting 143CONG. REC. S3947 (daily ed. May 5, 1997) and 143 CONG. REC.  H2021  (daily ed . Apr. 30, 1997)). 
90  Gordon, supra note 81, at 657.
91 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-89 § 103(a)(3)(1997). The statute provides threeexceptions to this requirement that states initiate termination proceedings. The exceptions apply when: thechild is in kinship foster care;  the state can demonstrate to the court a “compelling reason” why such apetition would  not serve the child’s best interests; or  the state has failed to provide the services which its
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ASFA’s proponents urged careful consideration of the child’s perspective becausethey were aware that the interests of parents and children do not always mesh.88  Severalmembers of Congress expressly stated that the balance of children’s and parents’ rights hadto shift under ASFA.89  As one commentator has noted, putting children first is “often‘difficult and painful.’ It is difficult because adults do not have children’s needs and cannoteasily see what they are.  It is painful because what is good for children may be unfair toadults.”90  Congress made clear that where it was not possible to be equally “fair” to childrenand their parents, ASFA requires courts to elevate the interests of the child over those of theparent. The effort to focus on children’s needs was embodied in the Act’s key provision,providing that in order to retain federal funding, the state “shall” move to terminate parentalrights with the goal of adoption or another form of permanent placement in two categories ofcases: (1) cases where it is apparent early on that the child cannot safely return homebecause of “aggravated circumstances,” such as torture or a felony assault; and (2) all casesinvolving children who  “have been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for 15of the most recent 22 months” (the “15/22 months rule”).91  Generally, the aggravated
own case plan “deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child’s home.”  Id.
92 ASFA establishes a  presumption that, after 15 months have passed, all children are better off if theirparental rights are terminated. Because this presumption is rebuttable only when one of the three statutoryexceptions listed supra  note 91 apply, the ASFA presumption may pit the claims of the state against thedemonstrable needs of some children. Early reports indicate that many states and courts are failing tocomply with the 15/22 months requirement. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  FOSTER CARE: RECENTLEGISLATION HELPS STATES FOCUS ON FINDING PERMANEN T HOMES FOR CHILDREN, BUT LONG-STANDINGBARRIERS REM AIN , GAO-02-585, 23-31 (June 2002).
93 42 U.S.C.A. § 675 (5)(C) (West 2003). This date may be longer than 12 months after the child wasremoved from the home. ASFA considers a child to have entered foster care on the earlier of “the date ofthe first judicial finding that the child has been subject to child abuse or neglect” or “the date that is 60 daysafter the date on which the child is removed from the home.” 42 U.S.C.A § 675 (5)(F) (W est 2003).Therefore, the permanency hearing might not occur until fourteen months after the child actually left theparents’ home, even assuming that court calendars allow the hearings to be conducted in timely fashion.
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circumstances cases are not complex in terms of either law or morality.  The facts of thosecases are so heinous that line-drawing should not prove difficult.  In cases involving“aggravated circumstances” the parent has already put the child’s life at risk.  In contrast, thecases in the second group are not so straightforward.  With the passage of time, terminationbecomes more and more likely, and the needs all children have for stability and permanenceare pitted directly against the claims of their parents.  In many, or even most instances,ASFA’s reforms promote the actual needs of the individual child.  Unfortunately, as I willdemonstrate in Section III, the complexities of child welfare cases are not always amenableto such an easy categorical fix.  As a result, if states consistently apply the statute as written,ASFA may unwittingly place the claims of the state in conflict with the demonstrable needsof at least some fraction of children.92  In addition to enunciating the “15/22 months” legal rule, the Act imposes specificaccelerated time lines for court proceedings designed to guarantee the child a permanentplacement, whether with the natural parents or somewhere else.  ASFA thus requires that acourt conduct a permanency hearing “no later than 12 months after the date the child isconsidered to have entered foster care.”93  It is this section of ASFA that squarely raises the
94 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATES’ EARLY EXPERIENCES IMPLEMENTING THE ADOPTION AND SAFEFAMILIES ACT GAO / HEHS-00-1 6 (Dec. 22, 1999).
95 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m-1) (West 1998).
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question raised in Santosky and left unanswered by the Supreme Court for thirty-five years:is the passage of time sufficient to establish a level of parental “fault” that satisfies the dueprocess clause for the purposes of irrevocably terminating a mother’s right to her child?The remaining sections of this article consider the interplay between the time lineand the respective rights of parents and children – rights that can either be mutuallyreinforcing, or may stand in direct conflict.  II.  The Mere Passage of TimeFederal law creates an implicit presumption that a parent who allows a child tolinger in foster care for 15 months is unfit.  By virtue of this assumption, in an effort toplace the child’s presumptive interests front and center, the Act sidestepped the essentiallegal question of how the state would establish legally sustainable grounds fortermination in light of the court’s obligation to consider the rights of the parent in theirchild. By the end of 1999, every state and the District of Columbia had amended localstatutes in an effort to comply generally with ASFA.94  Illinois reconciled the standard of“unfitness” with the 15/22 months rule by revising its statutes to provide, in part, that aparent may be found unfit if, pursuant to a court order, “a child has been in foster care for15 months out of any 22 month period.”95  In In re H.G., the only reported case to dateconsidering the due process implications of the 15/22 months rule, the Illinois SupremeCourt overturned the section of the state statute (“Section 1 (D)(m-1) of the Adoption
96 In re H.G., 757 N .E.2d 864, 865 (Ill. 2001). Although the court stated that the Illinois Adoption Act wenta step further than ASFA, it is hard to distinguish the Illinois language from the requirements of ASFA,since ASFA imposes a duty on the state to initiate termination proceedings if the child has been in fostercare for 15 of the last 22 months, regardless of whether any other grounds for termination exist.  Furthermore, the Illinois act provided defenses to termination that ASFA failed to provide. For example, theIllinois statute built in some judicial discretion, allowing the parent to “prove by a preponderance of theevidence that it is more likely than not that it will be in the best interests of the child to be returned to theparent within 6 months of the date on which a petition for termination of parental rights is filed.” 750 ILCS50/1  (D)(m-1) (West 1998). In other words, a parent who was almost in compliance and moving forward ina treatment plan could apparently stop the clock and gain a few extra months, if doing so would serve thechild’s best interests.  
South Carolina has enacted a  similar statute which adds a ground for termination where a  child “has been infoster care under the responsibility of the State for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months” andtermination is in the best interest of the child.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572 (W est 2003).
97 The briefs submitted to the Illinois Supreme Court offer different versions of the facts, which were neverlitigated. The summary of the facts in the opinion closely resembles the facts as stated by attorneys for themother. Brief of Respondent-Appellee, E.W ., Supreme Court of Illinois (No. JAK 96-041). The state’srendition of the facts predictably tells a more negative story about the mother who, the state alleges, hadfailed to protect two older daughters from sexual abuse at the hands of her lover, failed to provide necessaryfollow-up for H.G. after she had heart surgery, and visited H.G. only sporadically while she was in fostercare. B rief of Petitioner-Appellant, People of the State of Illinois. Attorneys who were appointed torepresent the children in a companion case made clear that the children whose placement was at issue inthat matter had no meaningful relationship with their mother since they had entered foster care at the agesof eight days and three and one-half months, respectively. Brief and Argument of Minors-Appellants inCharles S. and Joshua S. v. Heniak (Nos. 91  J 04221  and 92 J 20380).  (All briefs cited  here are on file withthe author).
98 In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d at 867.
30
Act”) that created this new ground of parental unfitness based on the length of time achild has remained in foster care.96  As summarized by the court, the facts of the case are not atypical.97  Illinoisremoved H.G. from her mother’s custody in March of 1996 because of neglect.  The statealleged that the mother had violated a protective order by allowing H.G. to see her father,and had grabbed H.G.’s arm on two occasions, causing it to dislocate.98  H.G. enteredfoster care.  Nine months later, in December of 1996, the court placed H.G. in the legalcustody of the state and ordered the mother to participate in a variety of services,including obtaining appropriate housing, participating in therapy, and completing
99 Id. The Illinois statute fleshed out one of the most important exemptions to the mandatory filingprovisions in ASFA. Under ASFA, the 15/22 months rule does not apply in cases where the state has notmet its service and treatment obligations to the natural parents. ASFA provides that the state does not needto file a termination petition based on the 15/22 month rule where “the state has not provided to the familyof the child, consistent with the time period in the state case plan, such services as the state deemsnecessary for the safe return of the child to the child’s home” – the undefined “reasonable efforts” that hadplagued enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. Adoption Assistance andChild Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272 § 101 (a)(1) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).For critiques of the reasonable efforts requirement as applied, see Gelles, supra note 56 at 95-113, 131  andCristine H. Kim, Note, Putting Reason Back Into the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Child Abuse andNeglect Cases,  1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287, 296-309 (1999).
100 The Illinois statute specified, however,  that the “15 month time limit is tolled during any period forwhich there is a court finding that the appointed  custod ian or guardian [i.e., the foster care system and itsagents] failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child with his or her family.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m-1) (West 1998). This standard is much more favorable to the family than the language of the federal statute.Under the language of ASFA, a child welfare system could drag its feet, offer inadequate services, and thenfully comply shortly before the termination hearing, and prevail. Under the  Illinois law, the parent wouldarguably get credit for every month during which she did not receive adequate services. Given the poortrack record  of many child welfare agencies around the country in providing services, this approach wouldlikely undermine ASFA’s goal of “fast track” permanency planning.  See, e.g., Mabry, supra note 58, at617-618, 626-630, 646 (discussing the risk that parental rights may be terminated simply because the familyis poor and no services have been provided).  The Illinois approach does, however, offer some protection toparents and to children who would be better off remaining with their parents.  Perhaps equally important, itmay provide an incentive for agencies to improve the responsiveness of their services. On the other hand, itmay be impossible for parents to pursue aggressively claims that they have received inadequate servicesbecause the  same caseworker and supervisor who they are claiming denied them services may continue tohold decision-making power in their case. But services, or the lack thereof, were not the focus of theappellate decision in H.G.’s case.
31
parenting classes.99  The record offers no indication of the relationship between themother’s housing and the allegations of neglect, nor does it indicate what services, if any,the state offered the mother in any of these three areas.100 In August 1998, 20 months after the trial court’s dispositional order and 29months (or two and a half years) after H.G. was removed from her home, the state filed apetition for termination of the mother’s rights.  The petition alleged that the mother wasunfit under section 1(D)(m-1) of the Illinois Adoption Act because she had failed eitherto make “reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for removal”
101 Id. at 867-70 It is often unclear when the 22 month period begins to run under ASFA, even though thestatute provides that “[a] child shall be considered to have entered foster care on the earlier of (i) the date ofthe first judicial finding that the child has been subjected to abuse or neglect; or (ii) the date that is 60 daysafter the date on which the child is removed from the home.” 42  U.S.C.A. § 675 (5) (F).   In re H.G.illustrates the problem. The Illinois courts stated that the 15-month time frame of section 1(D)(m-1) becameapplicable to the case only after the final continuance. Id. at 872 (asserting that “[n]ine of the 15 monthscovered by the state’s allegation of unfitness under section 1(D)(m-1) were directly attributable tocontinuances which were necessary to bring the case to tria l.”).  See also Riverside Co. Dep’t of PublicSocial Services v. R.M., 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d  187  (2003) (discussing confusion over when the clock begins torun).  
102 The length of time that H.G. drifted in foster care was not at issue in the case. From the small sample thatI have seen in my own consulting, and from the few reported cases, such postponements seem to continueto occur with great frequency.  The Government Accounting Office reports that most states do not collectdata on their compliance with the 15/22 month provision. The nine states that responded to a GAO inquiryabout the impact of the 15/22 month rule reported that “the number of children exempted from theprovision greatly exceeded the number of children to whom it was applied.”   U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTINGOFFICE,  FOSTER CARE: RECENT LEGISLATION HELPS STATES FOCUS ON FINDING PERMANEN T HOMES FORCHILDREN, BUT LONG-STANDING BARRIERS REM AIN , GAO-02-585, 26-27 (June 2002).
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or to make reasonable progress toward reunification.  Trial was originally scheduled forMarch, 1999, but seven months of continuances, some initiated by the state, followed.101In October 1999, 14 months after the state filed its petition for termination, 34months after the original disposition order, and 43 months after H.G. entered the fostercare system, the state filed an amended petition to terminate parental rights, this timeadding an allegation that the mother was unfit because H.G. had been in foster care for 15out of the preceding 22 months. Another series of continuances postponed the trial dateto the end of January 2000.  By its own terms, ASFA (as Illinois implemented it) failedH.G. dismally.  When the termination hearing finally began, she had been in foster carefor more than three years, more than the average length of time that children spent infoster care before ASFA became law.102 H.G.’s mother challenged Section 1(D)(m-1) on the grounds that it violated herdue process and equal protection rights because it is “not narrowly tailored to achieve itsmanifest purpose, improperly shifts the burden of proof to a respondent parent, andimproperly invites consideration of best interest issues at the fitness portion of a
103 In re H .G., 757 N.E.2d at 868, 873.
104 Id. at 868 (emphasis added).
105 Id. at 871.
106 Id. at 872. At a subsequent hearing, the judge refused  to return H.G. to her mother on the ground that itwould not be in her best interest even though he found that she could be safely cared for in her mother’shome. Id. at 869.  
107 Id. at 873.
108 Id. at 874.
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termination hearing,” in violation of the holding in Santosky.103  The trial court grantedthe mother’s motion on all three grounds, stating “[t]he problem is inherent in that thisparticular statute, unlike all of the other provisions for finding unfitness, relates not toconduct of a parent or an internal flaw of character or behavior or mental illness orphysical infirmity, but rather the mere passage of time.”104 The Illinois Supreme Courtexpressly rejected the state’s argument that “a fit parent does not allow his or her child tolanguish in foster care for fifteen months.”105  The court correctly pointed out that thecase before it “aptly illustrate[s]” that, “in many cases, the length of a child’s stay infoster care has nothing to do with the parent’s ability or inability to safely care for thechild but, instead, is due to circumstances beyond the parent’s control.”106  It continued, [b]ecause there will be many cases in which children remain in fostercare for the statutory period even when their parents can properly care forthem ... the presumption contained in section 1(D)(m-1) is not a narrowlytailored means of identifying parents who pose a danger to their children’shealth or safety.107In summary, the court stated, “[w]e decline to recognize that the State has acompelling interest in removing children from foster care in an expeditious fashion whenthat removal is achieved in an unconstitutional manner.”108
109 Santosky , 455 U.S.at 763, 763 n.13.
110 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 47 (1981 ) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“By intimidation,inarticulateness or confusion, a parent can lose forever all contact and involvement with his or heroffspring.”).
111 Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).  Defendants conceded that manychild welfare matters evade court review “because mothers will usually agree to attend whatever services[the agency] demands once their children have been in foster care for a few days.” Id. For this reason, thefederal guidelines for implementing ASFA recommend that “biological parents or legal guardians” receivelegal representation in jud icial proceedings, “even when the out of home p lacement originates as avoluntary placement.” Duquette & Hardin, supra  note 80, at VII-6.
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Clarity about legal standards and zealous protection of procedural rights isparticularly important in termination cases because a profound imbalance of powerpermeates the relationship between a mother and the state.  This imbalance not onlydominates the day-to-day dealings of the parties, it also allows the state to play a large rolein crafting the record that a court ultimately reviews in most, if not all, cases. As theSupreme Court observed in Santosky, in most termination proceedings, because “the child isalready in agency custody, the State even has the power to shape the historical events thatform the basis for termination,” thus increasing the risk of erroneous fact-finding.109 If the agency drags its feet, and fails to provide the parent with needed resources andsupport, fifteen months are likely to be consumed without any discernable change in theparent’s circumstances.  In addition, while the mother often lacks legal representation duringmuch, if not all of the process, the child welfare agency is represented by counsel from theinception of its relationship with the mother.   Because she lacks legal representation, themother may be intimidated, inarticulate or confused.110 Consequently, she may “consent” toa course of action from which it is hard to extricate herself (such as “voluntary” placementunder threat of coerced removal of her children).111  Equally important, caseworkers keepwritten records of the mother’s attitude, behavior and compliance, all of which can be
112 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[E]rrors of fact . . . in the State’s case may gounchallenged and uncorrected.”).
113 Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 254.
114 In many states, the reference to 15/22  months (or, in some instances, a shorter period) is found only inthe section on definitions, or in the section on when a termination petition should be filed, and the passageof time is not addressed in the portion of the code that spells out the grounds for terminating parental rights.A handful of states do not appear to have incorporated any reference in their statute to the 15/22  monthperiod set forth in ASFA.  These include Florida, Hawaii, Michigan, North Dakota, South Dakota, andVermont. The material discussed in the text accompanying footnotes 114  to 117, 120 and 126-127 areindebted to research performed by Johanna L. Ferraro (University of Pennsylvania Law School Class of2005) at The Field Center during the summer of 2002.
115 Res ipse loquitur, the thing speaks for itself, “[is a] doctrine providing that, in some circumstances, themere fact of an accident’s occurrence raises an inference of negligence so as to establish a prima faciecase.” BLACK’S LA W  DICTIONARY 1311 (7 th ed. 1999).
116 S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572 (8) (1998)(stating that the court may order termination of parental rightsupon a finding that the “child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for fifteen of the
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introduced as evidence at a termination hearing.  Because the caseworker has significantleeway to describe the mother as he or she sees fit in those records, the caseworker wieldsenormous power.  In addition, it may prove difficult or impossible to correct even factualerrors in the record.112  As one federal judge concluded, “the damage to constitutional rightsis accomplished in the many months preceding the opportunity for final judicialdisposition.”113Despite the clear risks that accumulate with the passage of time, less than one-thirdof all states have even attempted to craft a statutory rationale for terminating parental rights(absent other statutory grounds for termination) after a child has been in foster care for 15 ofthe preceding 22 months.114  The efforts of those states that have tackled the draftingproblem tend to fall into one of three approaches: (1) the prima facie case; (2) the rebuttablelegal presumption or “res ipse loquitur” case115; and (3) the “predictive” approach, based onevaluations of future parental capacity and behavior. The first approach (the “prima facie case”), exemplified by the statute overturned inIllinois and a similar (as-yet untested) provision in South Carolina,116 makes the placement
most recent twenty-two months”).
117 MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-604 (1) (2001). See also  IDAHO CODE § 16-1623  (i) (2003) (stating that thestate shall initiate termination proceedings based on this “rebuttable presumption” when a child  has been inthe department’s custody and  in out-of-home placement for 15 out of the preced ing 22 months).  
118 In many instances it is unreasonable to blame the parent for the persistence of the conditions that led tothe child’s initial removal. Examples include situations in which services are provided to children only onthe condition that those   children not remain in the home.  See MARY GILBER TI & RHODA SCHULZINGER,RELINQUISHING CUSTODY: THE TRAGIC RESULT O F FAILURE TO MEET CHILDREN’S MEN TAL HEALTHNEEDS, (Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, March 2000).
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of a child in foster care for 15 out of 22 months prima facie proof of parental unfitness andthus an independent ground for termination.  The surface advantage of this approach isobvious.  It enables lawmakers and judges to circumvent the logjam at the heart of ASFAwhich is created by the conflict between two legal principles: placing the child’s bestinterests first, on the one hand, and the constitutional imperative not to disrupt the parent-child relationship unless strict legal standards have been satisfied, on the other.The second approach (which I call the “res ipse loquitur” approach) is similar, butallows some flexibility.  Under this regime, if a child has been in foster care for 15 of thepreceding 22 months, the law establishes a presumption that the best interests of the childwill be served by termination of parental rights.117  This resembles the approach in tort lawthat under certain conditions, if one party has been injured (the child) then another party (theparent) must have been negligent, and thus blameworthy.  The presumption is that remainingin foster care for 15 out of 22 months causes injury to the child and this serves as evidenceof unfitness, because a fit parent would have regained custody of the child in that period oftime. Whatever the initial harm to the child may have been, this formulation makes thechild’s continuing presence in foster care an on-going harm attributable to the parent ratherthan to the state.118  The res ipse loquitur approach makes a useful conceptual contribution. It helps to focus the court’s attention on the harms the child has experienced both in the
119 In W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §40  (5th ed. 1984) (explaining that underthe res ipse loquitur doctrine, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on the preponderance of thecircumstantial evidence).
120 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-112 (j) (3)(B)(ii) (2003). The statute reins in judicial discretion by requiringthat in all cases where parents oppose termination of their rights, the trial court shall make written findingsregarding seven factors including: (1) the services offered to the parent; (2) the extent to which the state andthe parents fulfilled the terms of any applicable court order;(3) the child’s significant emotional ties with
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parent’s custody and as a consequence of the child’s prolonged stay in foster care.  The shiftin emphasis from the rights of the parent to the needs of the child is exactly what ASFAintended.  But even though the res ipse loquitur presumption is expressly or implicitlyrebuttable, it shares some of the infirmities found in the Illinois law at issue in H.G.  Oncethe plaintiff (the child, represented by the state) has established by circumstantial evidencethat reasonable persons could conclude that the injury was caused by parental negligence,the parents’ defense relies on a strong showing of an alternative explanation, which theparents may not be able to establish.119  The third, and in my view most promising, approach requires that the court predictthe likelihood that the parent will be a fit or unfit parent for this child in the near future.  Thestatutes that adopt a predictive approach require the court to evaluate both the extent towhich the state has provided the parent with rehabilitative programs and other opportunitiesto meet the state’s demands, and the parent’s efforts to address the state’s concerns while thechild has been in foster care.  In Connecticut, for example, the statute expressly provides aground for termination where the child has been in the custody of the state for 15 of the 22preceding months andthe parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitatethe return of the child to the parent . . . and has failed to achieve such degreeof personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within areasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parentcould assume a responsible position in the life of the child.120  
the parents or any other guardian in whose care the child has been for at least twelve months; (4) the child’sage; (5) the parent’s efforts to address the conditions which led to the child’s removal; (6) the parent’svisitation with the child while the child was in out-of-home placement; (7) and the extent, if any, to whichthe parent’s effort to maintain a relationship with the child were constrained by unreasonable acts on thepart of any other person or by the parent’s economic circumstances.  CONN. GEN. STAT.. § 17a-112 (k)(1-7).
 See also  ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088 (d)(4-5) (2002) (stating that a petition to terminate parental rights isappropriate where the parent has made “three or more attempts . . . to remedy the parent’s conduct orconditions in the home without lasting change; or . . . a parent has made no  effort to remedy the parent’sconduct or the conditions in the home by the time of the  permanency hearing . . . .”); ARIZ. REV. STAT..ANN.§ 8-533 (B)(7)(b) (West 2003) (“[T]he parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances whichcause the child to be in an out-of-home placement and there is a substantial likelihood that the parent willnot be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.”).
121 See In re Crystal E., 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3305, *80-82 (2001) (granting termination based onmother’s “failure to rehabilitate” despite intensive services where the mother, who was raised in a series offoster homes herself, had a juvenile record and dropped out of school after ninth grade, persisted in criminalactivity, substance abuse, aggressive behavior, relationships with violent men and a  continuing inability tomeet her child’s needs). As the court explained, “Crystal, who has languished so long in foster  care, ‘shouldnot be further burdened by having to wait for her mother to achieve the level of rehabilitation necessary toparent her.’”  Id. at *72.
122 State Dep’t of Human Resources v. A.K ., 851 So.2d 1, 9  (2002) (reversing the tria l court’s refusal toterminate parental rights and committing the three children to a residential facility instead of an identifiedadoptive home as an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 851 So.2d 23 (Ala. Nov. 27, 2002).
123 States vary in their approach to what period of time the court may look at when determining fault. InConnecticut, the court may only consider the parent’s behavior up to the date when the state filed thepetition to terminate parental rights. In re Daniel C., 776 A.2d 487 , 500 (2001). In other jurisdictions, thecourt considers evidence pertaining to the parents’ behavior up to the date of trial, which arguably gives thecourt a more complete picture. See In re the Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W. 2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980), cited inIn re the Welfare of D.T.O., 1999 WL 431093, at  *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 29, 1999).
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This standard allows the court to take the child’s sense of the passage of time into account,and to weigh it heavily against the parent’s plea for more time to attempt rehabilitation.  Theapproach is premised on the view that children cannot tolerate prolonged delay while theirparents relapse into harmful behavior.121  As one trial court put it, “children cannot afford tospend the rest of their childhood waiting for their father and mother to also grow up.”122Courts are bound by the record in determining parental “fault” and in attempting topredict whether a child can be safe with that parent in the future.123 According to theAmerican Psychological Association, specific evidence of past behavior is the best basis for
124 Joan B. Gerbasi, Richard  Bonnie & Renee L. B inder, Resource Document on Mandatory OutpatientTreatment, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 127, 142 (2000) (stating that in the context of civilcommitment, predictions of “future dangerousness . . . should be based on the occurrence of such episodesin the recent past.”).
125 Raelene Freitag & Madeline Wordes, Improved Decision Making in Child Maltreatment Cases, 3 J. CTR.FAM., CHILD. & CTS. 75, 75 (2001) (explaining how risk assessment tools help to categorize families, butdo not provide a reliable predictor of specific behavior).
126 MINN. STAT. § 260C.301 (1)(b)(8) (2003).
127 MINN. STAT. § 260C.007 (24)(c) (2003).
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prediction of future behavior.124  Records in termination cases are replete with evidence ofpast behavior on which to premise predictions of future parenting behavior.  There is,however, no easy checklist that agencies and courts can rely upon in their effort to predictwhether a child can be safe with his or her parents.  As psychologists explain, “[e]ach case isunique, often involving complex and confusing facts, and the stakes – the safety and welfareof a child – are very high.”125A modification of the predictive approach emphasizes the extent to which predictionis based on past acts for which the parent may equitably be held responsible.  In Minnesota,for example, the statute provides for termination of parental rights on the grounds that thechild “is neglected and in foster care.”126  This ground for termination applies to childrenwho have been placed in foster care by court order, who cannot currently be returned to theirparents, and “whose parents, despite the availability of needed rehabilitative services, havefailed to make reasonable efforts to adjust their circumstances, condition or conduct. . . .”127The court is directed to make findings regarding how long the child has been in foster care,as well as about the parent’s efforts to rehabilitate and to maintain contact with the child, andwhether the state offered reasonable services to the parent.  These latter two factors attempt
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to focus the court on parental behavior while the child has been in foster care rather than onthe mere passage of time.  In contrast to Minnesota’s approach, the terms of ASFA sidestep the relationshipbetween the passage of 15 months in foster care and the imperative that the state mustestablish parental fault.  In circumventing the constitutional requirement that the state proveparental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence before terminating parental rights, thelaw does a disservice to both parents and children. Children who have been in foster care forfifteen months or more, who are not likely to return home safely in the near future, and forwhom a permanent home has been identified should be able to take advantage of ASFA andbe legally adopted and integrated into new families.  But if the state fails to come to gripswith its burden to prove parental unfitness, it may wrongfully deprive parents and childrenof a legally protected relationship that is beneficial to the children and unwittingly subjectsuch children to continuing uncertainty in the form of a lengthy appeals process.  In order for ASFA’s 15/22 month provision to survive wider appellate scrutiny,the state (including both the child welfare and court systems) bears the onus of keepingeach case on schedule in accordance with the statute’s time lines and of insuring thatparents receive the services they need.  If the state were to accomplish these goals, anyefforts to terminate parental rights in neglect cases would necessarily be based onallegations of persistent unfitness in the face of opportunities to change and not merelythe passage of time.  The burden on the state promotes the child’s legal anddevelopmental interests as well as the parent’s rights because the child may not be wellserved by an unnecessary permanent separation from a parent whom the child regards ashis or her primary caretaker.
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In addition to the individual children whose unique histories indicate that theyshould not be severed from their parents, there are identifiable and predictable sub-classes of children who should not be permanently separated from their mothers basedsolely on the clock running out at fifteen months.  Examples of these circumstances arethe focus of the next section.
128 See discussion, supra  note 100.
129 42 U.S.C.A. § 671 (a)(15)(D) (defining the “aggravated circumstances” which eliminate the requirementthat the state make “reasonable efforts” to preserve the family).
130 42 U.S.C.A. § 671 (a)(15)(B).
131 Id.
132 Pub.  L. 105-89 § 1305 (b)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 629a (7)(A)) (time-limited family reunificationservices designed to “facilitate the reunification of the child safety” apply “only during the 15-month periodthat begins on the date that the child . . . is considered to have entered foster care.”). Some states provideservices for a shorter period of time. In Utah, a parent may not receive reunification services for more thantwelve months, or, if child is under three years of age, eight months. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-311(2)(c)(iii), (2)(f) (2003). Such statutes underscore that the “overarching purpose” of the child welfare lawsis to “provide stability and permanency for abused and neglected children” by indicating a clear legislativeintent that “ a parent wishing reunification with his or her child must act quickly towards that end.”  Utah v.S.L., 995 P .2d 17, 28  (Utah Ct. App. 1999).  
42
III.  Hard Categories, Harder CasesCurrent federal law retains the prevention and reunification provisions that wereenacted as part of the Child Welfare Act of 1980.128  ASFA modifies the “reasonable efforts”provisions of the 1980 Act by providing that some small proportion of children have beenhurt so badly, and some parents are so clearly incapable of transformation, that in thosecases, time and resources should not be wasted on fruitless efforts that disserve children whowill never go home.129  In all other instances, ASFA as integrated with pre-existing lawrequires that “reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families.”130“Reasonable efforts” include providing services that would “prevent or eliminate the needfor removing the child from the child’s home,” as well as services following removal “tomake it possible for a child to safely return to the child’s home.”131  Consistent with itsvision of termination after a child has remained in foster care for 15 months, however,ASFA specifies that the state is no longer obligated to provide services to the family after theexpiration of the 15 month period.132
133  See U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOSTER CARE: RECENT LEGISLATION HELPS STATES FOCUS ONFINDING PERMANEN T HOMES FOR CHILDREN, BUT LONG-STANDING BARRIERS REM AIN , GAO-02-585, 6-7(June 2002).
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By allowing the state to curtail services for the mother after a child has been in fostercare for 15 months (regardless of when the mother actually began to receive the services),ASFA may exacerbate the constitutional infirmities of the 15/22 months rule, as viewedfrom the perspective of the parent’s rights.  A range of common parental problems, such assubstance abuse, imprisonment, and domestic violence, are not amenable to speedyresolution.  Under ASFA, each of these problems might form the basis for termination of amother’s rights as soon as the fifteen month period expires, even if the child couldpotentially be kept safe in the home with sufficient services.  Some children of mothers whohave such problems might be better served by preservation of the parental bond than bytermination.  An individualized determination of the child’s best interests would weigh suchfactors as the child’s age, the specific nature of the mother-child relationship, demonstratedharm to the child, and the identified placement alternatives.  Because ASFA imposes acategorical imperative that parental rights be terminated after the passage of a certainamount of time, it does not appear to permit the exercise of judicial discretion in response tothe best interests of those children who would be better off retaining a legal relationship withtheir mothers.133
134 H. R. Rep. No. 105-77 at 19.
135 Id. Other commentators point to a smaller but still impressive percentage of substance abuse among theparents of children in the child welfare system.  M ary O’Flynn, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of1997: Changing Child Welfare Policy Without Addressing Parental Substance Abuse, 16 J. CO N TE M P.HEALTH L. & POL’Y 243, 245 (1999)(stating that two thirds of the children within the child welfare systemsurveyed had  at least one parent with a substance abuse problem). For purposes of the discussion here, it isnot material whether substance abuse causes child maltreatment or whether caseworkers become involvedwith families where substance abuse is suspected because the caseworkers believe that abuse andmaltreatment are linked. 
The text accompanying footnotes 135-150 is indebted to research assistance provided by Eliza Kaiser,University of Pennsylvania Law School class of 2002.
136 See Yuriko Egami, Psychiatric Profile and  Sociodemographic Characteristics of Adults Who ReportPhysically Abusing or Neglecting Children, 153:7 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 921, 923, 926-27 (1996).
137   U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOSTER CARE: AGENCIES FACING CHALLENGES SECURING STAB LEHOMES FOR CHILDREN O F SUBSTANCE ABUSERS, GAO/HEHS-98-182, 2 (Sept. 1998).
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A. Substance Abuse. Substance abuse is highly correlated with child neglect and abuse.  WhenCongress adopted ASFA, it noted that, along with poverty, substance abuse is “one of thethree most common reasons for children entering foster care.”134  Substance abuse occursin “up to 80% of substantiated abuse and neglect cases.”135  Both alcohol dependency andregular use of illegal substances show a high correlation with child neglect, althoughdirect causation has not been demonstrated.136  The General Accounting Office reportsthat most children in foster care have at least one parent who abuses one or more illegaldrugs such as cocaine, methamphetamines or heroin, and most parents who use illegalsubstances have done so for five years or more, suggesting that they will not be readilyamenable to rehabilitation.137 The common relationship between the removal of children from their homes anda variety of biases involving race, class and other norms has been widely noted, and someof those factors may also be implicated in child welfare cases involving substance
138 See generally  DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR O F CHILD WELFARE (2002); PEGGYCOOPER DAV IS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES (1997); Catherine J . Ross,Families Without Paradigms: Child Poverty and Out-of-Home Placement in Historical Perspective, 60OHIO ST. L. J. 1249, 1256-61, 1291-92 (1999).
139 See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT AND THEADOPTION ALTERNATIVE, 67-81, 207-32 (1999). But cf. Mabry, supra  note 20, at 620 n.84. (“On the otherhand, it would be a grave mistake for one to make a generalization that presupposes that alcoholics anddrug users neglect their children.”).  
140 U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 125, at 12. See also  Egami, supra  note 12, at 927. In theearly 1980s, as an Assistant Professor of History at the Yale Child  Study Center, I worked closely withAlbert Solnit and Joseph Goldstein on a number of problems, including an effort to promote individualizedconsideration of whether a parent’s substance abuse in fact interfered with the child’s care in eachindividual case. If, for example, a substance abusing mother meets the child’s needs or  makes reliablearrangements for a relative to care for the child, the state should not take the position that substance abuseequals prima facie neglect. See generally  ALBERT J. SOLN IT, BARBARA F. NORDHAUS AND RUTH LORD,WHEN HOME IS NO HAVEN: CHILD PLACEMENT ISSUES (surveying cases of child abuse and neglect) (1992). 
141 THE NATIO NA L CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NO SAFEHAVEN: CHILDREN O F SUBSTANCE ABUSING PARENTS 18 (1999)[hereinafter CASA] (quoting Felicia, age17). 
142 CASA at 16 (quoting LaTasha, age 18).
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abuse.138  It is, however, misguided to ignore the pernicious effects that parentalsubstance abuse may have on children, regardless of the precise substance of choice.139 Substance abuse can alter judgment, diminish impulse control, and stimulate aggression. At the core of the problem, substance abuse may make it impossible for a parent toperceive – much less respond to -- a child’s needs.  The inability to perceive the worldaround her accurately often interferes with the parent’s ability to minister to the child’smost basic needs.140  As one teenager reflected, looking back on a substance-abusingmother, “I realize that drugs were more important than me, that I didn’t come first in mymother’s life. She wasn’t worried about if I ate or where I slept – she was more worriedabout drugs.”141  Another teen summarized her experience with a substance-abusingmother, saying, “She was always off doin’ her own thing.  She wasn’t even really amom.”142
143 Judges have been criticized for being unclear about the genesis of substance abuse and arbitrary in theirrecommendations for possible treatment. See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment And The DrugTreatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q . 1205, 1230-34 (1998). 
144 In re H .G., 757 N.E.2d at 872  (lamenting the fact that if the state makes “reasonable effort[s] to get theparent the appropriate treatment,” the clock will keep running even if the services are never provided).
145 U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 137, at 42 & n.65.  
146 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, BLENDING PERSPECTIVES AND BUILDING COMMONGROUND, A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CHILD PROTECTION (Apr. 1999). This reportwas prepared in response to ASFA’s recognition that substance abuse services need to be more closelylinked to child protective services. H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, at 15 (requiring HHS to report on the problem).
147 CASA at 35.  See also  United States General Accounting Office, supra  note 122, at 42 & n.65 (reportinginadequate resources for treatment and  a lack of collaboration between treatment providers and childwelfare agencies).
148 CASA at 36; Polina Friedland, Children and Mothers at Risk: A System Failing to Alleviate theDevastation of Drug Abuse, 10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 107, 124-26 (2000).
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For purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to enter into the debate overwhether substance abuse has its genesis in illness, is a rational response to stress, orresults from moral failings.143  From the perspective of the ASFA timeline, the criticalissue is that “parents are frequently ordered to undergo drug treatment or othercounseling as a condition to regaining custody of a child in foster care.  Given therealities of limited funding, it is not uncommon for there [sic] to be waiting lists toreceive such services.”144  Thirty-nine of the 46 states that responded to a recent federalsurvey reported that they lacked sufficient drug treatment programs.145  The dearth ofservices is even more pronounced for women than for men.146  Social workers report thatmany women feel trapped - they fear that if they voluntarily enter a treatment program,they run the risk that their children will be removed from them and placed in fostercare.147  Policies that result in forced separation of children from mothers who entertreatment programs run counter to research suggesting that mothers who are able to keeptheir children while in treatment are more likely to complete treatment successfully.148
149 See E.g., NORMAN K. DEN ZIN , TREATING ALC O HO LIS M  88 (1987) (estimating that up to seventy percentof those completing rehabilitation for alcohol abuse relapse within six months). 
150 CASA at  8 (“Every child has a right to have his or her substance-abusing parents get a fair shot atrecovery with timely and comprehensive treatment.”).
151 Mariely Downey, Losing More Than Time: Incarcerated Mothers and the Adoption and Safe FamiliesAct of 1997, 9 BUFF. WOMEN ’S L.J. 41, 41 , 45 (2001); See also  Leslie Acoca & M yrna S. Raeder, SeveringFamily Ties: The Plight of Nonviolent Female Offenders and Their Children, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.133, 136 (1999) (explaining that the “war on drugs” disproportionately impacts women and depriveschildren of their mothers).
152 Christopher J. Mumola, Incarcerated Parents and Their Children, Bureau of Justice Statistics SpecialReport NCJ 182335 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice) Aug. 2000 at 4.
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Even where services are available, substance abusers often require several coursesof treatment before they stop relapsing (and some never succeed in breaking the cycle ofaddiction or significantly improve their ability to function).149  From the vantage point ofa mother’s parental rights, this suggests that when the state removes children because ofneglect stemming from a mother’s substance abuse, the 15-month clock is likely to runbefore a mother can establish that she has successfully completed treatment.  The runningof the clock is of equal concern from the child’s point of view if it means that the childloses the chance to have a sound relationship with a parent because timely,comprehensive treatment is not available for that parent.150The likelihood that a mother will regain custody of a child who has entered thechild welfare system is further diminished if the mother is incarcerated as a result of herabuse of illegal substances.  As many as eighty percent of incarcerated women aremothers, and most of those are single mothers.151  Nearly two-thirds of women in stateprisons report that their children lived with them until they were incarcerated.152  If awoman is in prison because of drug related offenses, the court may have been required tosentence her under mandatory sentencing guidelines without discretion to consider the
153 Id. at 6; Nicole S. Mauskopf, Reaching Beyond the Bars: An Analysis of Prison Nurseries, 5 CARD OZOWOMEN ’S L.J. 101, 104-5  (1998)).  
154 Acoca &  Raeder, supra note 151, at 136.
155 Mumola, supra  note 152, at 1. 
156 Id. at 1, 3. In contrast, less than 2% of male state or federal prisoners who lived with their children beforeentering prison report that their children are in foster care. The data do not indicate whether any of thechildren in foster care are in a kinship foster care arrangement, in which case ASFA would not require thestate to file a petition to terminate parental rights (“TPR”).
157 Acoca & Raeder, supra  note 151, at 136 (quoting the United Nations Special Rapporteur on ViolenceAgainst Women).
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impact of the sentence on her children.153  When men who live with their children enterprisons, over 90% report that the children remain with the child’s other parent; only onepercent of children of male inmates entered foster care.154  In stark contrast, only 28% ofwomen prisoners report that their children are living with the children’s father.155 Although over half of the children of women prisoners live with grandparents or otherrelatives, nearly 10% of women prisoners report that their children have entered fostercare – putting them at risk of termination of parental rights since the average mother in astate prison is expected to remain there for 49 months.156If applied mechanistically, the 15/22 months rule would be a death knell for theparental rights of all parents with children in foster care who remain in jail for more thana year and a half. From the vantage point of the incarcerated mother who wishes to retaina relationship with her child, the state’s reliance on the 15/22 months rule seems patentlyunfair. As one women’s advocate explained, “[f]or many inmates, children are a life-sustaining force.  To break that bond is a punishment of the worst kind.”157 In order toavoid categorical severance of the parental rights of all incarcerated women, courts couldperform an individualized assessment.  Such an assessment could examine the mother’s
158 Id. at 138-140.  
159 In the Matter of J.L.N., the Nevada Supreme Court found that the mother overcame the statutorypresumption that her child’s best interests would be served by termination.  55 P.3d 955 (2002), Themother, who the court noted had no substance abuse problems and had provided a stable home for herchildren for several years, was serving a sentence for vio lating the conditions of her parole on an oldconviction for forging checks, after her boyfriend turned her in to authorities for leaving the state withoutpermission. Over the mother’s objections, the children were left in the care of the boyfriend, whosubsequently abused them. The children were placed in foster care in another state. The child welfareauthorities refused to transfer the children to the custody of their maternal grandmother, whose home was inthe state where the mother was serving her sentence. The mother fulfilled every condition of her case planthat could be accomplished while she was in prison, maintained contact with her children and the childwelfare agency, and was scheduled to be released no later than 11 months after the trial court terminatedher rights (before the ruling issued on her appeal). See id. at 956-958. The court overturned the lowercourt’s decision terminating the mother’s parental rights because the tria l court had found parental fault“solely based ‘on the passage of time.’” Id. at 960 .  
160 Id. at 961 (reversing termination); Johnson v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Services, 78 Ark. App. 112,120, 82 S.W .3d 183, 188  (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming termination); In re Dependency of J.W. v.Williams, 90 Wash. App. 417, 426, 432, 953 P.2d 104, 109 , 112 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming
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fault and predict her future behavior by looking at such factors as whether she haspursued opportunities for treatment, cooperated with and completed services that weremade available, relapsed and tested positive for drugs, experienced further arrests, andwhether she used every available means to maintain contact with her child (such aswriting letters, calling and seeking visits).  Unfortunately, effective treatment programsfor women involved with the criminal justice system are virtually non-existent.158  Butunder ASFA, the incarcerated mother could permanently lose her rights to her child evenif she made every feasible effort to rehabilitate herself, communicate with her children orhave them visit her in jail.159  Regardless of what the court finds about the relationshipbetween a particular mother and her child, the 15/22 months are likely to expire while themother remains in prison. Even where courts insist that the state establish a ground for termination otherthan the passage of time, incarceration is likely to contribute to termination under moregeneralized theories of fault.  Appellate courts in several states have expressly held thattermination may not be based solely on the parent’s incarceration.160  In most instances,
termination); In re R.P., M.P. and G.P., III, 498 N.W .2d 364, 368   (S.D. 1993) (affirming termination); Inthe Interest of P.O.M., 255 Ga. App. 534, 536, 566 S.E.2d 334, 337 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (affirmingtermination) (citing In the Interest of R.H., 240 Ga. App. 551, 553(2), 524 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999));In re Interest of Brettany M. et al. v. Brett W., 11 Neb. App. 104, 120, 123, 644 N.W.2d 574, 587, 590(Neb. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming termination).
161 Brettany M.,644 N.W .2d at 588  (upholding termination in the case of a father who was the primarycaretaker of special needs infant and  her sibling, had petitioned the court to establish paternity and gaincustody, but who was serving at least nine years in prison for assaulting the children’s mother).
162 Patricia Allard, Life Sentences: Denying Welfare Benefits to Women Convicted on Drug Offenses(Washington D.C.: The Sentencing Project 2002) at 1, (citing the Personal Responsibility and WorkReconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193 § 115  (a) (1996)).
163 Id. (reporting the results of a study of the 28 states that imposed “immediate and lifetime ineligibilityfollowing a conviction” affecting 92,000 women as of December 2001 and calling for repeal of theprovision as likely to lead to the dissolution of families).
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however, courts treat incarceration as a factor in determining whether the parent will beable to resume parenting obligations, looking at “factors being related to incarceration”rather than deciding to terminate parental rights based “solely” on the fact ofincarceration.161  Commentators have largely overlooked two recent changes to the federal law,which courts are likely to erroneously view as “factors being related to incarceration”bearing on a mother’s ability to resume parenting responsibility.  First, as part of theTemporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) legislation, Congress “stipulatedthat persons convicted of a state or federal felony offense involving the use or sale ofdrugs are subject to a lifetime ban on receiving cash assistance and food stamps.”162 Forty-two states are enforcing the ban in full or in part and, although it applies only tobenefits for the mother, it is likely to diminish the household income of paroled drugoffenders significantly and result in the mother’s “neglect” of children who have beenreturned to her.163  In a second development during 1996, the federal governmentauthorized local Public Housing Authorities to obtain criminal records and to use
164 Id.  at 12 (citing Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-120 (1996)). For a discussion of how this policy undermines the “authority of poor black and brown” mothers over theirchildren, see Regina Austin, “Step on a Crack, Break Your Mother’s Back”: Poor Moms, Myths ofAuthority, and Drug-Related Evictions from Public Housing, 14 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 273 (2002).
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information about drug convictions to deny public housing to people “hav[ing] a drugconviction or are suspected of drug involvement.”164  This provision may not only barmothers convicted of drug offenses from obtaining public housing, it also may mean thatthey cannot stay with relatives in public housing without subjecting their hosts to the riskof eviction.  The combined blow of a lifetime ban on welfare benefits and lack of accessto public housing severely diminishes the prospect that a mother newly released fromprison will be able to convince authorities that she can provide a safe home for herchildren.  Since ASFA provides that the state does not have to engage in “reasonableefforts” after a child has been in foster care for 15 out of 22 months, the poverty thatresults from a mother’s status as a drug offender may be transformed into an unwarrantedjustification for permanently severing her from her children.In the absence of broader social reform, however, termination because arelationship has withered while a parent is in prison fulfills ASFA’s intention to requirethe law to look at foster care through the child’s eyes.  From the viewpoint of a youngchild, it may not matter why her mother is unable to care for her. What matters is thatwhatever stability she once had has been disrupted, her mother has not been her primarypsychological parent and, perhaps (if she is lucky), someone else now occupies that placein her life.Conflict between the needs of the child and the desires of the parent may bebrought to a head even before termination is an issue.  The mother may have a right tomaintain her relationship with her child even while using drugs or incarcerated, but the
165 This example is based on a consultation by the author. In this instance, the parent who disappeared wasthe mother, and the imprisoned parent was the father, but the sex of the imprisoned parent does not affectthe analysis. A remarkably similar reported case is Dependency of J .W.,953  P.2d 104, except that J.W.’sfather, a serial rapist, was likely to remain in prison until she reached maturity. Because seven-year-oldJ.W. had no bond with her father, and “appeared bored and confused when she visited him in jail,” the trialcourt denied the father the right to have her visit him in prison as harmful to her welfare. Id. at 110, 112.
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child may have an equally strong claim not to have contact with a parent if such contactis more harmful than beneficial.  Consider, for example, a young child in a stable, pre-adoptive foster home, who has no memory of either of his drug-addicted parents.  Oneparent—who is still addicted to crack—has vanished, and cannot be located by the childwelfare agency.  The other parent, who is in prison on charges related to drugs and hasnot seen the child for several years, requests that the agency bring the child for a visit andthe agency complies.  As a result of contact with his virtually unknown parent in jail, thechild experiences severe developmental setbacks.  These setbacks include rage, severeenuresis, and other behavioral manifestations so pronounced that the foster parentsreconsider whether they want to adopt the boy, ultimately asking the agency to removehim from their home.  Meanwhile, the parent is granted parole, expects to be releasedshortly, and seeks custody.165  How should a court respond to an absent parent’s demands for continuedvisitation and custody? The child’s best interests must weigh heavily in the decision, butthat is not necessarily a sufficient response to the claims of parental rights, especially ifthe parent has completed drug counseling and was a model prisoner.  On the other hand,it is hard to imagine how a parent newly released from prison, without an apartment or ajob, whose kin were not available to care for the boy when the parent was sentenced, willbe able to handle the stresses of parenting a demanding child while seeking to adjust tolife after prison. These conflicting priorities of mothers’ rights and children’s needs may
166 In re Doe , 159 Ill.2d 347, 370-71, 638 N.E.2d 181, 191-92 (Ill. 1994) (Supplemental Opinions UponDenial of Rehearing) (McMorrow, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing) (arguing that whether theparental rights doctrine  or the best interests of the child should prevail is a matter for the legislature todetermine, but the court should hear questions including “the extent of the court’s duty to protect childrenwhen that pro tection may conflict with parental rights established by law.”). 
167 In re K.R., 128 Wash.2d 129, 146, 904 P.2d 1132, 1141 (Wash. 1995). (quoting In re Sego, 82 Wash.2d736 , 738, 513 P.2d 831, 832 (W ash. 1973)). See also  Johnson v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Services, 78Ark. App. 112, 119, 82 S.W .3d 183, 187 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) (“Parental rights . . . will not be enforced tothe detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the child.”). 
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be irreconcilable both as a matter of generally applicable law and as applied to specificcases.  Congress concluded that such conflicts must be resolved in favor of the child’sneeds, whether or not the mother is at “fault” in the sense of intent, omission or otherfacts suggesting accountability as opposed to strict liability.  When a court is confrontedwith such a choice, the child’s interest outweighs the parent’s claim because thelegislature has made it clear that the consequences of any other decision are too harmfulto the child and, ultimately, to society.166  As the State of Washington’s highest courtpronounced even prior to the ASFA regime, “when the rights of parents and the welfareof their children are in conflict, the welfare of the minor children must prevail.”167   This child-centered view does not depend on any interpretation of mothers asgood or bad, self-sacrificing or selfish.  It reflects the law’s intervention as defender ofthose least able to protect themselves; even where women have been victimized orunfairly treated, the law presumes that adult women can rise to their own defense at leastto some extent but that children cannot.  Even within that framework, however, theprinciple of balancing irreconcilable claims in favor of the child rather than the mothershould not allow the law to sidestep the analytical question of how to reconcile placingchildren first with the liberty interests of parents, as it attempts to do under ASFA’s15/22 month rule.
168 See N aomi Cahn, Battered Women, Child Maltreatment, Prison and Poverty: Issues for Theory andPractice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & LA W  355, 359 (2003).
169  See generally  Judith J. Gische, Domestic Violence as a Factor in Custody Determinations in New YorkState , 27 FO R DH A M  URB. L.J. 937 (2000) (discussing “a growing national trend to give greater attention tothe serious effect domestic violence has on children.”); Laurel A. Kent, Comment, Addressing the Impact ofDomestic Violence on Children: Alternatives to Laws Criminalizing the Commission of Domestic Violencein the Presence of a Child, 2001 WISC. L. REV. 1337, 1342 (arguing that realization of underreporting ofdomestic abuse has led some researchers to estimate that more than 90% of domestic violence incidents are“witnessed” by children); Jeffrey Edleson, Children’s Witnessing of Adult Domestic Violence, 14  J. OFINT ERR PER SO NA L VIOLENCE 839 (1999) (reviewing the social science and medical litera ture); AMERICANBAR ASSOCIATION, THE IMP ACT O F DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN, 1 (American Bar Association1994) (estimating that up to 10 million children may witness domestic abuse annually).
170 The unanticipated loss of custody by mothers occurs in the private law sphere as well as in the childwelfare system. See Gische, supra  note 169, at 937-38. (discussing a 1996 New Y ork State statute requiring
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In the final section of this paper I turn to a category of cases involving domesticviolence, in which the independent but mutually supportive interests and liberty claims ofmother and child may remain congruent in the face of the challenge the 15/22 month ruleposes to their ability to survive as a family.  B. Battered Mothers and Their Children.A large number of incarcerated women, presumably including some of the jailedsubstance abusers discussed in the previous section, have experienced domestic abuse.168 But many other victims of domestic violence who have no history of drug abuse, havenever been imprisoned and have neither abused nor neglected their children, the womenwho are the focus of this section, are also at risk of having their children removed fromtheir care.  Advocates for battered women and their children have succeeded inpromoting the widespread realization that children who witness domestic violence are itsvictims even if the children do not suffer physical trauma themselves.169  Thisdevelopment, however, had an unanticipated effect when it resulted in the removal ofchildren from battered mothers who had succeeded in protecting them from witnessingany abuse, or who had successfully extricated themselves from their relationships withtheir abusers.170
that the court must consider the issue of domestic violence in determining custody disputes, when raised byeither party, but providing no guidance on how to define violence or how heavily to weigh it).
171 Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp.2d 15 3, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting a mandatory preliminaryinjunction), supplementing 181 F. Supp.2d, 182 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2002), question certified by Nicholson v.Scopetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003), certified question accepted, 2003 WL 22770072 (N.Y. Nov. 25,2003) (No. USCO A 2, 171). 172 Id. at 165-65. The court offered  to create a second subclass of alleged batterers, but no  one appeared tojoin that class. Id. at 165.
173 Id.  at 164.
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Mothers who are victims of domestic violence too often become the subjects of“double abuse,” in the words of District Court Judge Jack Weinstein: first by a partnerand then by the state “through forced unnecessary separation of the mothers from theirchildren on the excuse that this sundering is necessary to protect the children.”171  In reNicholson, a case that should become a landmark, Judge Weinstein considered the claimsof a class of battered mothers whose children were deemed neglected by the New YorkCity Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS” or “the City”) solely because themother was a victim of domestic abuse. (The court also considered the claims of a court-created subclass of their children.)172  Judge Weinstein reflected early on that the caseinvolved “three sometimes conflicting principles”:First, as a parent, a mother has rights to uninterrupted custody of herchildren and a child has rights to remain with parents; within wide limits,adults and children in a household are immune from state prying andintrusion.  Second, domestic abuse – particularly if physical – of a motheror child will not be tolerated. Third, the state has the obligation to protectchildren from abuse, including, where clearly necessary to protect thechild, the power to separate the mother and child.173  The court held that the City had violated the right of mothers and children to live together(the first principle) by misconstruing its mandate not to tolerate domestic abuse (thesecond principle) and by unjustifiably relying on that mandate when it misused its power
174 Id. 
175 See V. Puallani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws’ Failure to Protect Battered Womenand Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN ’S L.J. 229, 229-30 (1996) (arguing that women who are victims ofdomestic violence should only be held accountable for failing to protect their children if they failed to act asa reasonable person in their position would have acted, where they had the ability to affect the outcome). 
176 Nicholson v. Williams et al., 202 F.R.D. 377, 380 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (the class includes all persons subjectto domestic violence or its threat who are legal or de facto custodians of children “but where the childrenthemselves have not been physically harmed . . . by the non-battering custodian”).
164 Id. 
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to separate children from their mothers in order to protect the children from abuse (thethird principle).174 The ten women named as plaintiffs in Nicholson display remarkable similarities. Not one plaintiff mother had struck or physically abused her child.  In each instance, oneor more children were removed from a battered mother either because the batterer hadalso attacked the child (and the mother had “failed to protect the child”),175 or morecommonly, because the mother either had not extricated herself from the abusivesituation or, in the process of trying to separate from her abuser, entered a transitionalsituation that was not deemed appropriate for the child (such as no longer having anapartment to live in). Indeed, the definition of the class omitted battered mothers who hadabused their children or were still failing to protect their children from abusers.176  Inmany instances, mothers included in the class had been charged with neglect or abusebased on strict liability, even though their children had not witnessed the abuse and hadnot suffered either physical or emotional harm in the mother’s home.177The sharp parallels to the problems that ASFA’s 15/22 months rule creates formothers with histories of substance abuse, discussed above in Part III.A, are readilyapparent, including the reluctance of many mothers to seek help (even if it were
178 Nicholson , 203 F. Supp. 2d  at 204; See also Nancy K.D. Lemon, The Legal System’s Response toChildren Exposed to Domestic Violence, 9 Future of Children 71 (1999) (asserting that battered mothersfrequently have their parental rights terminated even when neither the mother or batterer has abused thechildren); Katie Scrivner, Domestic Violence Victims After Welfare Reform: Looking Beyond  the FamilyViolence Option, 16 WIS. WOMEN ’S L.J. 241, 252 (2001) (battered women fear that if they flee anddisappear, with or without their children, they will ultimately lose custody of their children).
179 Nicholson , 203 F. Supp. 2d  at 194.  See also   Shelly Kintzel, Comment, The Effects o f DomesticViolence on Welfare Reform: An Assessment of the Personal Responsibility and Work OpportunityReconciliation Act as Applied to Battered Women , 50 U . KAN. L. REV. 591, 593-602 (2002) (summarizingthe literature on the ways in which abusers sabo tage women’s efforts to tra in for or maintain employment,the relationship between poverty and domestic violence, and other barriers to leaving).
180 The three published opinions in the case mention ASFA only once, in the context of the complexinteracting federal, state and local statutes and regulations implicated by the issues in the case. SeeNicholson, 202 F.R.D. at 381.
181 Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 163.
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available) due to fear that scrutiny will lead to removal of the children from the mother’shome.178  Mothers who are victims of domestic violence, however, have an even strongerargument than substance abusers that they are not “at fault,” especially in light of themany obstacles to separating from an abusive situation.  These obstacles include theincreased physical danger to the woman and her children in the period immediatelyfollowing her departure, the lack of domestic violence shelters, an inability to findpermanent housing, and a lack of employment.179The interaction of the City’s treatment of abused mothers and the ASFA time linewas not an issue in Nicholson,180 and the record does not indicate that any of the namedclass representatives in Nicholson suffered the termination of parental rights (perhaps inpart because they were well represented once they became part of the class).  But theissues of removal, passage of time, and delay are likely to mean that some proportion ofmothers who are victims of domestic violence will lose their children permanently, for noother reason than that City agencies acted with “benign indifference” while the clock ranto 15 months.181
182 Commentators have long noted that “the child’s best interests would be better served by removing theabuser from the family than by removing the child from the home.” Rachel Venier, Parental Rights and theBest Interests of the Child: Implications o f the Adoption and Safe Families Act o f 1997 on  DomesticViolence Victims’ Rights, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 517, 534 (2000); See also Annette R.Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child ProtectionSystem, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 588 (1997). Of course, this approach only works when the mother is preparedto leave her abuser.
183 ASFA provides that older adolescents have the right to decline adoption.  
184 See generally JOHN BOWLBY,  ATTACHEMENT: ATTACHMENT (1969); JOHN BOWLBY,  ATTACHMENT:SEPARATION, ANXIETY AND ANGER (1973); JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT: LOSS, SADNESS ANDDEPRESSION (1980).
185 Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 198-200 (quoting expert testimony).
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The child’s independent interest in remaining with his or her mother and siblingsor, alternatively, in maintaining a legal relationship with her biological family constitutesa corollary of the mother’s interest in preserving her parental rights.182 ASFA imposes alegal presumption that every child who has been in foster care for 15 out of 22 monthswould be better off severing ties with her biological parents and moving into a newpermanent situation, unless the case falls within one of the three enumerated exceptions. It assumes that although the natural parent may continue to speak legally for the childuntil the termination proceedings are completed, the state, advocating termination, moreaccurately represents the child’s best interest.  In many, or even most, instances, this maybe true, especially in cases involving physical abuse of the child.  But ASFA leaves nodiscretion for taking into account the individual child’s interest in remaining with hernatural family.183  The psychological and emotional detriment to a child who is separatedunnecessarily from a parent (and siblings) has been well documented.184  The childsuffers the trauma of separation, leading to such symptoms as fear, anxiety, depression, adiminished sense of self and regressive behavior.185  All of the symptoms associated with
186 Id. at 253.
187 Id. at 199.
188 Id.  (quoting Dr. David Polcovitz) (opining that children of battered mothers have a significantly elevatedrisk of separation anxiety disorder).
189 See id.  at 200.
190 Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 , 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (reversing dismissal of a complaint pursuant to42 U.S.C. §1983 based on the separation of two minor children from their mother without her consent andwithout benefit of a court hearing or order).  The Second Circuit reiterated  in 1999 that the members of afamily have a  “fundamental right” to “remain together without the coercive interference of the awesomepower of the state.”  Tenenbaum v. W illiams, 193 F.3d 581, 599, 600 (2d Cir. 1999) (ho lding that atemporary separation for one afternoon did not implicate the family’s substantive due process rights).
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loss occur at the same time that the child “confront[s] an unfamiliar and often dangerousfoster care system,” including the frequent pattern of separation from friends,neighborhood and school.186  Children frequently believe that they are responsible for thebreakup of the family following domestic violence just as they do in cases of divorce. The intensity of those feelings may be exaggerated where the state intercedes due todomestic violence because the child does not know whether the battered parent is safe.187 
One expert has explained that “taking a child whose greatest fear is separationfrom his or her mother and in the name of ‘protecting’ that child [by] forcing on them,what is in effect, their worst nightmare, . . . is tantamount to pouring salt on an openwound.”188  Such evidence materially undermines any claim that the state serves thechild’s best interests when it separates children from mothers who are victims ofdomestic violence.189The right of a mother and child to remain together arguably does not belong to themother alone. The Second Circuit recognized a “right to the preservation of familyintegrity encompassing the reciprocal rights of both parent and children a quarter of acentury ago in Duchesne v. Sugarman.190  Finding a “mutual interest in an interdependent
191 Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 825 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 545, 651  (1972) (citing Meyer v.Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923);  Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); May v. Anderson345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)))
192 Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 233-34. In its interim opinion on Nicholson, the SecondCircuit noted that removal of a child from a “blameless” parent presented  a serious substantive due processquestion and observed that the courts of New York State had never “reached the issue as to whetherremoving a child from a battered mother serves the interests of the child.” Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d154 , 173-74 (2d Cir. 2003). New York’s highest court accepted  certification of that question as this articlewas going to press. 2003 WL 22770072, 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 18877 (N.Y. Nov. 25, 2003).  Sinceconstitutional rights are not absolute, presumably the child’s right to family integrity would be overcome bysufficiently compelling state interests (i.e. showing of parental unfitness following procedures that comportwith due process requirements). Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring). (concluding that “if a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family over the objections ofthe parents and their children without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so wasthought to be in the children’s best interest, I should have little doubt that the State would have intrudedimpermissibly on the private realm of family life which the state canno t enter.”) . See also  Nicholson, 203 F.Supp. 2d  at  241 (claiming that Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) recognizes “the fundamental rightof a parent and child to reside together.”). 
193 See OFFER, 431 U.S. at 839 . See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131  (1989).
194 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130-31.
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relationship,” the Court of Appeals identified what it labeled “consistent support” inSupreme Court decisions concerning the rights of parents.191  In Nicholson, JudgeWeinstein expanded this doctrine by enunciating an interest in “familial integrity,” whichguarantees all family members a right not to be separated from each other.192   Supreme Court opinions skirt the issue but offer some support for the argumentthat the liberty interest is reciprocal.193  In Michael H. v. Gerald D., for example, theplurality expressly noted that the Court “never had occasion to decide whether a child hasa liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filialrelationship” and declined to do so in what it construed as a case involving a claim topreserve a child’s relationships with two “fathers,” one biological and one—the mother’shusband—statutory.194  In a compelling dissent Justice Brennan went a step further.  Herecognized that the relationship between the biological father and his child constituted “a
195 Id. at 151 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196 See generally Ross, An Emerging Right, supra  note 11; Ross, Vulnerability to Voice, supra  note 11.
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liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause,” and acknowledged the child’sclaim that she too had a “liberty interest” in that relationship.195I have argued in a variety of other contexts that children may have libertyinterests independent of their parents, and that the law should take the young person’sexpression of those interests seriously.196 Applied to ASFA, this argument suggests thatwhere child and parent each assert a complementary independent liberty interest inpreserving the parent-child relationship, the court should weigh the child’s argumentheavily. Despite its intended focus on the child, ASFA, as currently designed, does notafford courts the opportunity to take the individual child’s views into account.  Allowinga child’s views to be heard does not mean that the child’s preferences will trump all otherarguments. Among other things, even seriously abused children frequently have strongfeelings of attachment to their abusers, and the child’s safety should remain paramount.  ASFA also fails to take the different needs of children of varying ages intoaccount in formulating the 15/22 months rule.  Age is one of the factors that shouldweigh for or against termination because the child’s age has predictable consequences. Achild’s age affects the depth of the relationship between the child and the biologicalparent, as well as the child’s memory of that relationship. The infant placed at birth willobviously have no experience with her biological mother, and may have a well-developed relationship with a foster family, while the 14-year old may have positivefeelings toward her mother, and regard the foster family as a recent intrusion.  Equallyimportant, if the state terminates the biological mother’s parental rights to a 14-year-old,
197 Children over the age of 11 make up nearly half of the foster care population, but less than 14% of thechildren adopted out of foster care are over 12-years-old.  U .S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra  note 80,at 21-22  (June 2002) (stating that children adopted from foster care “are much more likely to be under age12.”). The unintentional – but predictable –  creation of legal orphans through termination of parental rightspreceded ASFA.  See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination ofParental Rights of Children in Foster Care – An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L. Q. 121, 140(1995) (“Modern reforms aimed at helping families in need have resulted in creating the highest number ofunnatural orphans in the history of the United States.”). 
198 Monica Drinane, Foster Care & Adoption Reform Legislation: Implementing the Adoption and SafeFamilies Act of 1997, 14  ST. JOHN’S J. LEGA L COMMENT. 441, 444 (2000) (discussing teenagers whoseparents’ rights were terminated when the child was six or seven, but who were never adopted). Inadministering ASFA states distinguish between teenagers and younger children by providing that teenagersmust be given the right to consent before they are adopted.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra  note 94,at 29. (finding that some teenagers “have strong ties to their families, even if they cannot live with them,and will not consent to adoption.”).
199 Catherine J. Ross, Families Without Paradigms: Child Poverty and O ut-of-Home Placement inHistorical Perspective, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 1249, 1290-91 (1999) (“Separation from siblings remains one ofthe most devastating aspects of the foster care and adoption systems.”).
187 See id..
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she is likely to become a “legal orphan” – a child who is legally free for adoption but forwhom the state cannot find an adoptive home.197  Whether or not they are freed for anadoption that remains only a fantasy, many adolescents who graduate from foster careturn to their biological families for support.  If the parental rights of the biological parenthave been terminated, legal services lawyers report, teenagers “often come back and sayto us, ‘You know, I want that termination vacated because I want to have a connectionwith my biological family.’”198Existing sibling relationships may be a factor in the resistance some olderchildren mount to adoption because termination of parental rights also terminates thelegal relationship between siblings who may be placed separately.  Many children infoster care have indicated that one of the most painful parts of their experience was theloss of siblings.199  When one sibling is adopted, and others remain in foster care, theyoften lose touch with each other completely.200  Termination also severs ties with other
201 Based on confidential evaluation files and follow-up provided to the author by Dr. Annie Steinberg ofChildren’s Hospital of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. This resourceful boy circumvented the system byrecruiting a woman from his church to become a foster parent for him and his sister. The arrangement fellapart after the foster mother became ill, and the  boy was last known to be living with his grandfather. 
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blood relatives including grandparents, aunts, and uncles, with whom the child may havea beneficial relationship of long standing.Some young people are sophisticated enough to fight to retain important familyties.  One 14-year-old resisted an adoptive placement that involved moving out of a fosterhome in which he had resided for eight years.  He insisted that his younger sister neededhim and talked about setting up a household in which he and his sister could livetogether. He fantasized that if the parental rights of his severely neglectful and detachedmother were terminated, he would claim custody of his sister from wherever she hadbeen placed when he graduated from the system at age eighteen. Responding to thestate’s notion that he could no longer linger in the legal limbo of foster care for the fouryears that remained of his minority, he stated simply, “the law is retarded.”201   He mayhave been too harsh.  But in this instance the law may be “doctrinally challenged.”  Thecomplexity of parental termination cases may not be amenable to the attractive simplicityof a timeline or any other mechanistic solution.   It may not be possible to respondcategorically to the needs of all vulnerable children. The application of general principlesto specific cases may be more likely to lead to sensitive decisions about each neglectedchild. This approach would not require us to throw out the ASFA reforms, but ratherwould call for continued tinkering.  The ultimate goal should be to replace blanketpresumptions – whether they favor parents, as in the old regime, or children, as in theASFA regime – with nuanced appraisals of individual relationships that enable judges to
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respond to the individual child who is, under ASFA, the proper focus of any terminationproceeding.IV.  ConclusionTermination and permanency raise issues that cut across many visions of therights of children.  In the child welfare context, children clearly have a right to beprotected and cared for, if not by their parents, then through the state’s intervention. As much as children need to be taken care of, simple substitution of one paternalisticpresence (the state) for another (the biological parent) is not sufficiently responsive tochildren’s claims.  Just as ASFA recognizes that children’s interests may diverge fromthose of their parents, so too may the interests of children diverge from the presumptionsenunciated by the state.  From the perspective of rights theory, children often have both aprocedural and substantive interest in preserving family relationships that benefit themand a correspondingly strong claim to be legally free to join a new family where the factswarrant it. If we lived in a world where no child was ever removed unnecessarily, everychild who was removed returned home as soon as basic safety could be assured, andwell-designed services were available to all who needed them, then a sound legal groundfor termination would generally exist after the passage of 15 months.  In such ahypothetical world, one whose existence ASFA presumes, the state would be able todemonstrate the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence withoutrelying on the mere passage of time.  In this hypothetical universe, by the time the statefiled for termination of parental rights the claims of mother and child would usually be atodds just as ASFA presumes them to be. 
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In the messier world that mothers and children actually inhabit, cases at themargins elude easy solutions.  These marginal cases raise two separate and equallyimportant legal problems.  First, the mother’s constitutional interests in her relationshipwith her child require that the state establish clear individualized grounds for termination.The passage of time, without more, does not appear to satisfy the heavy burden imposedon the state.  Second, the child in any individual case may be better off retaining a legalrelationship with her mother. Thus, the court considering a petition for terminationshould be required to hear any arguments a child offers for preserving the relationshipand should have discretion to take those arguments into account.  Both of these issuesmay be addressed if courts are required to assess the likelihood that an individual parentwill be a fit or unfit parent for the individual child in the near future, rather than relyingsolely on a categorical 15-month rule.The irrebuttable presumption embedded in ASFA’s 15/22 month rule fails to dojustice to every mother and every child that appear in a termination proceeding.  The ruleprevents courts from considering the narratives of each individual mother and child andof their unique relationship.   It ignores context in favor of a bright line rule.  Inaccounting for a child’s sense of time and need for continuity, the resolution of eachchild’s case requires consideration of the individual child’s unique strengths,vulnerabilities, personal history and desires.  The law a crude instrument at best needs toendeavor to respond flexibly to the minority of cases in which an individual child wouldbe better off returning to his or her mother even after the passage of time.The lack of clear legal grounds for termination under the 15/22 months rule is theelephant in the room that no one wants to talk about. The legal grounds for termination
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after 15 months in foster care must be clarified, and the standards must address dueprocess concerns. Clarification would reassure both child welfare agencies and the courtsthat hear their termination petitions that “permanent” decisions will withstand subsequentjudicial review in the rare instances where an appeal is filed.  Sensitivity to theconstitutional stakes for parents is doctrinally required.  A predictive approach, involvingjudicial scrutiny of whether a parent is likely to be able to resume safe parenting withinthe child’s time frame, is the test least likely to violate constitutional rights.  Thepredictive approach at its best would integrate consideration of the child’s best interestswith assessment of parental fault by asking whether this individual parent would be ableto resume parenting responsibility for this individual child, considering the child’sspecific developmental needs and time frame.  Children whose circumstances diverge from ASFA’s bright line approach totermination would benefit from restoration of discretion within the parameters of arebuttable presumption that children who have been in foster care for 15 of the last 22months should be legally free to enter a new permanent family.  Such restored flexibilitywould enable courts to respond appropriately to individual children whose circumstancesdo not fit the normative model.  An approach that incorporates this flexibility withoutgiving judges unlimited discretion might even help both mother and child come to termswith the court’s decision regardless of who “wins” and who “loses” in any giventermination proceeding.  A clear nexus between the passage of time and aconstitutionally sufficient showing of parental fault would help to insure that therelationship between mother and child is not terminated needlessly in cases where theirinterests converge, and would also enable courts to take into account the unique child’s
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point of view, rather than the viewpoint the state imputes to all similarly situatedchildren.
